Cryptographically Secure Information Flow Control on Key-Value Stores
Paper i proceeding, 2017

We present Clio, an information flow control (IFC) system that
transparently incorporates cryptography to enforce confidentiality
and integrity policies on untrusted storage. Clio insulates develop-
ers from explicitly manipulating keys and cryptographic primitives
by leveraging the policy language of the IFC system to automatically use the appropriate keys and correct cryptographic operations.
We prove that Clio is secure with a novel proof technique that is
based on a proof style from cryptography together with standard
programming languages results. We present a prototype Clio implementation and a case study that demonstrates Clio’s practicality.

information-flow control



Lucas Waye

Unknown organization

Pablo Buiras

Harvard University

Owen Arden

University of California, Santa Cruz

Alejandro Russo


Stephen Chong

Harvard University

ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Dallas, ,


Informations- och kommunikationsteknik


Datavetenskap (datalogi)