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Dahl, M., Bengtsson, K., Fabian, M. et al (2020). Guard extraction for modeling and control of a collaborative assembly station. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 53(4): 223-228.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2021.04.053>

N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.

Guard extraction for modeling and control of a collaborative assembly station^{*}

Martin Dahl^{*} Kristofer Bengtsson^{*} Martin Fabian^{*}
Petter Falkman^{*}

^{*} Department of Electrical Engineering, Chalmers University of
Technology, 412 96 Göteborg, Sweden (martin.dahl |
kristofer.bengtsson | fabian | petter.falkman)
@chalmers.se.

Abstract: A transition system represented by guards and actions can be amended by new guards computed in order to satisfy some specification. If the transition system is the result of composing smaller state machines, guard extraction can be used to put the new guards onto the guards the original state machines. Planning and verification can then be performed directly on the system with additional guards. In this paper we discuss the benefits of applying guard extraction as part of the modeling work in a modular control architecture, where reusable resources are composed using specifications. We show with an example from the development of an industrial demonstrator that even if the specification language is limited to invariant propositions, in practice many common safety specifications can be expressed when combined with a notion of which transitions are allowed to be restricted.

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Keywords: Discrete event systems in manufacturing

1. INTRODUCTION

Automation systems are becoming increasingly complex, with automated planning algorithms (Ghallab et al., 2016), online robot motion planning (Alterovitz et al., 2016; Perez et al., 2016), cyber-physical automation systems (Monostori et al., 2016) and collaborative robots (Bauer et al., 2008).

Developing these systems with traditional engineering methods also becomes highly complex (Dahl et al., 2016), especially when developing online planning algorithms, that not only needs to be reliable and fast, but also adaptive and flexible. To aid in this trade-off, this paper presents an automated design process using *guard extraction* (Miremadi et al., 2011), that support the engineering work by simplifying control modeling, improving reusability, as well as improving quality by ensuring correctness.

The control system developed by this process is using a resource based control architecture defined in Dahl et al. (2019). In this architecture, resources are modeled in isolation in order to be reusable and guard extraction is one of the tools used to ensure safe interaction between them. The development of an industrial demonstrator is used as an example to motivate why even the simplest kind of control logic synthesis – automatically ensuring invariant propositions – can be an important tool, especially for modeling purposes. In practice, specifying behavior using invariant propositions is a common use case which covers a lot of safety requirements.

In the applied control architecture, the decision of which action to take next is based on the current valuations of the *variables* of the involved resources (e.g. sensor readings). As such, there are neither state nor event labels, instead the control system is interested only in the combinations of variable valuations that make up a certain state, and under which conditions the system can transit between these states.

The paper is structured as follows: starting with some preliminaries in Section 2, we then give a brief introduction to the control architecture our method is applied to in Section 3. The guard extraction procedure is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 details how the guard extraction procedure was used for modeling and control for an industrial demonstrator using the control architecture. In Section 6 concluding remarks are made.

2. PRELIMINARIES

Definition 1. A transition system (TS) is a tuple $\langle S, \rightarrow, I \rangle$, where S is a set of states, $\rightarrow \subseteq S \times S$ is the transition relation and $I \subseteq S$ is the nonempty set of initial states.

Definition 2. A state $s \in S$ is a unique valuation of each *variable* in the system. E.g. $s = \langle v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n \rangle$.

Variables have finite discrete domains, i.e. Boolean or enumeration types.

The transition relation \rightarrow can be created from transitions that modify the system state:

Definition 3. A transition has a *guard* predicate function and a set of *action* functions, which can update variables making up a state. Formally we encode transitions by explicitly writing the next values of each variable to primed

^{*} This work has been supported by UNIFICATION, Vinnova, Produktion 2030, and UNICORN, Vinnova, Effektiva och uppkopplade transportsystem.

mirrors of them that we refer to as next-state variables, but to save space we often write the guard as a partial function over the system's variables (the rest are “don't cares”) and any variables not included in the transitions' set of action functions keep their current value.

Example: a system with two Boolean variables x and y has $S = \{\langle \neg x, \neg y \rangle, \langle \neg x, y \rangle, \langle x, \neg y \rangle, \langle x, y \rangle\}$. A transition with the guard predicate $\neg x$ and the action function x is encoded formally as $\neg x \wedge x' \wedge (y \Leftrightarrow y')$. In this example \rightarrow is thus $\{\langle \langle \neg x, \neg y \rangle, \langle x, \neg y \rangle \rangle, \langle \langle \neg x, y \rangle, \langle x, y \rangle \rangle\}$.

3. CONTROL ARCHITECTURE

In this control architecture, the resources making up the automation system are controlled by a central planner continuously deciding which transitions to take. Resources are modeled independently of each other, and composed by 1) adding specifications that ensure various properties as well as 2) adding new transitions that capture new state that emerge from their composition. In this work the focus is on using guard extraction, as described in Section 4, to ensure invariant propositions. The remainder of this section will briefly define how the control architecture used in the demonstrator is structured, starting with models of the individual resources.

3.1 Resources

Devices and software algorithms in the system are modeled as *resources*, which group their local state and discrete descriptions of the tasks they can perform. The resource state is encoded into variables of three kinds: *measured state*, *command state*, and *estimated state*. Measured and command states correspond to inputs and outputs to/from the control system, while estimated states are internal memory, usually to keep track of something.

Definition 4. A resource r_i is defined as $r_i = \langle V_i^M, V_i^C, V_i^E, O_i, I_i \rangle$ where V_i^M is a set of *measured* state variables, V_i^C is a set of *command* state variables, V_i^E is a set of *estimated* state variables, and O_i is a set of *generalized operations* defining the resource's abilities. I_i is a set of allowed initial states. Let $V_i = V_i^M \cup V_i^C \cup V_i^E$.

3.2 Generalized operations

A *generalized operation* is defined to be able to express both low-level ability operations and later on planning operations, in a way that allows formal techniques for verification and planning to be applied. Operations essentially group predicates (Boolean functions) and transitions that can update the local state of a resource, into logical units that define the tasks that a resource can perform. Predicates can, but do not need to, have names to clarify their meaning. We write these as *name* : *function* where *name* is an arbitrary name and *function* is the Boolean function that defines the predicate.

Definition 5. A generalized operation o_j is defined as $o_j = \langle P_j, G_j, T_j^d, T_j^a, T_j^e \rangle$. P_j is a set of named predicates over the state of the resource variables V_i . G_j is a set of un-named guard predicates over the state of V_i . The sets T^d and T^a define *control* transitions that update V_i , where T^d defines transitions that require (external from

the ability) deliberation and T^a defines transitions that occur automatically whenever possible. T_j^e is a set of *effect* transitions describing the possible consequences to V_i^M of being in certain states. A transition $t_i \in T^d \cup T^a \cup T^e$ has a guard predicate which can contain elements from P_j and G_j and a set of actions that update the current state if and only if the corresponding guard predicate evaluates to true.

T_j^d , T_j^a , and T_j^e have the same formal semantics, but are separated due to their different uses: deliberation transitions T_j^d require external input in order to be taken by the control system (e.g. input from an online planning system). Automatic transitions T_j^a are taken whenever possible by the control system. Effect transitions T_j^e define how the *measured state* is updated, and as such they are not used during control like the control transitions T_j^d and T_j^a . They are important to keep track of however, as they are needed for online planning and formal verification algorithms, as well as for simulation based validation.

It is natural to define when to take certain actions in terms of what state a resource is currently in. To ease both modeling, planning algorithms, and later on online monitoring, the guard predicates of the generalized operations are separated into one set of named (P_j) and one set of un-named (G_j) predicates. The named predicates can be used to define the current state of an operation in terms of the set of local resource states defined by this predicate.

3.3 Ability operations

The behavior of the resources in the system is modeled by *ability operations* (abilities for short). Instead of having unique predicate names for the states of an ability (e.g. “is closing”), it is useful to define a number of “standard” predicate names for abilities to ease modeling, reuse, and support for online monitoring. In this work common meaning is introduced for the following predicates: *enabled* (ability can start), *starting* (ability is starting, i.e. a handshaking state), *executing* (ability is executing, i.e. waiting to be finished), *finished* (ability has finished), and *resetting* (transitioning from finished back to enabled). For most abilities, the transition between *enabled* and *starting* will have an action in T^d , while the transition from *finished* to *enabled* will have an action in T^a .

3.4 Planning operations

Control of an automation system can be abstracted into performing *operations* (Lennartson et al., 2010). While ability operations define the low-level tasks that different resources can perform, planning operations model how to make the system do something *useful*. The planning operation k is defined as the generalized operation O_k and the estimated state variable \hat{O}_k with the domain $\{i, e, f\}$. For the operation k , $P_k = \{\langle \text{init}, \hat{O}_k = i \rangle, \langle \text{executing}, \hat{O}_k = e \rangle, \langle \text{finished}, \hat{O}_k = f \rangle\}$. P_k is used to keep track of the current state of the operation, which is later used in order to collect the current goal states of the system. The operation has one deliberation transition $t_k^d \in T_k^d$, with the guard predicate $\text{init} \wedge g_j$ (where *init* refers to *init* in P_k) and the action function $\hat{O}_k := e$. This represents

starting the operation, where $g_j \in G_k$ is an unnamed predicate defining the *precondition* of O_k . Finishing the operation is defined by the automatic transition $t_k^a \in T_k^a$ defined by the guard predicate $executing \wedge g_k$ with the action function $\hat{O}_k := f$, where $g_k \in G_k$ is a predicate defining the *postcondition* of O_k . Operations do not have effect transitions: $T_k^e = \emptyset$.

4. GUARD EXTRACTION

Invariant properties can be ensured by making sure that states where the properties do not hold cannot be reached, however, when the environment is part of the model this does not make much sense, as the environment cannot be restricted arbitrarily. But by combining the restriction on events with a notion of which *control actions* are allowed to be restricted, a very natural way to model that the system is waiting for something external to the controller (i.e. some action) to happen, or that some action is important and should always need to be allowed to happen emerges. To model this, we borrow the concept of *uncontrollability* from Supervisory Control Theory (SCT) (Ramadge and Wonham, 1987). In SCT, the goal is to find a supervisor that disables *controllable* events generated by a plant in order to satisfy some specification, while *uncontrollable* events should always be allowed. Furthermore, the resulting supervisor should be maximally permissive (Ramadge and Wonham, 1987), i.e. it should restrict the system as little as possible.

Consider a situation where a resource is shared between two processes. Most likely it is the *acquisition* of the resource that we want to restrict, i.e. under which circumstances should we be allowed to acquire the resource, rather than controlling when to *release* the resource. As such, the act of acquisition is naturally modeled as a controllable event, while the release of it is uncontrollable – it is in theory controllable but we want to design the system to release the resource as soon as we are done with it. In context of the control architecture defined in Section 3, the acquisition would be a *deliberation* transition, and the release would be an *automatic* transition.

Another situation is when we are waiting for an effect that occurs due to the controller interacting with the environment, for example, waiting for input from some sensor. As it is the environment that produces the effect, it cannot be controlled (by the control system). We would like to capture that we are in a waiting state however, and that from this state execution will continue, so we model transitioning between the waiting and done state as an uncontrollable event. This situation corresponds to the *effect* transitions defined in Section 3.

4.1 Symbolic state representation

With a symbolic representation (Burch et al., 1992), sets of states are represented as Boolean functions. If a system is represented by the Boolean variables x and y , the set of states $\langle \neg x, \neg y \rangle, \langle x, \neg y \rangle, \langle \neg x, y \rangle$ can be represented by the Boolean function $\neg(x \wedge y)$. The functions representing sets can then be manipulated by Boolean operations. Using the representation of a transition defined in Definition 3, a set of next states can be computed from a set of states

by taking the conjunction of the function representing the set with the function representing the transition(s). If the initial states of a TS are represented by the Boolean function $\phi(s)$ and the transitions of the TS are represented by the function $\gamma(x, x')$ (e.g. $t_1(x, x') \vee t_2(x, x') \dots$ where x, x' represent the current-state and next-state variables respectively), exploring the state space symbolically can then be done by finding the fix-point of:

$$\phi_0(s) = \phi(s)$$

$$\phi_{i+1}(s) = \phi_i(s) \vee \exists s'. (\phi_i(s') \wedge \gamma(s', s))$$

Quantifying the source states out of the conjunction (i.e. $\exists s'. (\phi_i(s') \wedge \gamma(s', s))$ above) with the transitions, is commonly defined as the *relational product* (**relprod** below). Naively, this fix-point computation can be implemented as in Listing 1, where **initial** is a Boolean function representing the initial states, **trans** is a Boolean function representing the transitions, **vs** and **vsn** are the system variables where **vsn** represent the next-state variables. The **replace** function replaces each next-state variable with its corresponding state variable.

```

fn reachable(initial, trans, vs, vsn) {
  let mut r = initial;
  loop {
    let old = r;
    let new = relprod(old, trans, vs, vsn);
    let new = replace(new, vs, vsn);

    r = logical_or(old, new);
    if old == r {
      break;
    }
  }
  return r;
}

```

Listing 1: Implementation of symbolic breadth first reachability.

Let us give an example to illustrate both the symbolic representation and how it automatically gives us guard extraction, if the set S_g of reachable and safe (safe as in not violating some specification) states is already computed.

Consider a TS represented with the variables x, y , a transition relation containing $\neg x \wedge x' \wedge (y \Leftrightarrow y')$ and $\neg y \wedge y' \wedge (x \Leftrightarrow x')$, and $(\neg x \wedge \neg y)$ as the initial state. If $\neg(x \wedge y)$ is a specification and both transitions are controllable, it is easy to see that all safe and reachable states S_g can also be represented by $\neg(x \wedge y)$. Any new guards for some transition t constrained by S_g can be extracted by taking the relational product of t and S_g , where \bar{t} is t applied *backwards*, i.e. with the current- and next-states of t swapped. The result of this computation is the symbolic representation of all source states from where taking t ends up in the safe set S_g . Thus, for the transition that changes x , any new guard(s) can be extracted by taking the transition $\neg x \wedge x' \wedge (y \Leftrightarrow y')$ backwards, i.e. $x \wedge \neg x' \wedge (y \Leftrightarrow y')$ from S_g by taking the conjunction of the two formulas, $x \wedge \neg x' \wedge (y \Leftrightarrow y') \wedge \neg(x \wedge y)$ which gives $x \wedge \neg x' \wedge (y \Leftrightarrow y') \wedge \neg y$. Quantify out x and y to get $\neg x' \wedge \neg y'$, which only contains the next-values x' and y' , which in this case represents the *source states* of the original transition (as it was taken backwards). Substitute x' with x , and y' with y , and we get the final guard $\neg x \wedge \neg y$,

of which $\neg x$ was the original guard of the transition and $\neg y$ is the added guard that forbids the system from violating the specification.

During implementation, ordered binary decision diagrams (Bryant, 1992) are commonly used to efficiently manipulate the Boolean expressions. In practice this results in the function representing S_g containing terms that make no difference to the end result. For human understanding it is important to post-process the generated guards. See for example Miremadi et al. (2011).

What is left then is to find the set S_g containing the safe states. Ideally, S_g should be *maximally permissive*, i.e. contain as many states as possible, allowing for maximum freedom for the planning system.

4.2 Finding the safe states S_g

As stated, we want to find the maximally permissive set S_g containing the states that are safe to be in (e.g. those that do not violate a specification). The problem we want to solve is called synthesis w.r.t. controllability in the SCT literature. We can solve this by computing the set of reachable states (S_r) and the set of forbidden states (S_x). Then $S_g = S_r \cap (S - S_x)$ contain all safe states. Listing 2, shows how to apply the symbolic reachability function to compute S_g , where **trans** is a Boolean function representing all transitions of the system and **buc** is a Boolean function representing the uncontrollable transitions backwards.

```
fn safe_states(initial, forbidden, trans, buc, vs, vsn) {
  let r = reachable(initial, trans, vs, vsn);
  let f = reachable(forbidden, buc, vs, vsn);

  return logical_and(r, logical_not(f));
}
```

Listing 2: Finding the safe states: **safe_states** returns the set S_g symbolically.

4.3 Algorithm for resource composition

Visiting all reachable states of course puts a hard limit on the size of the systems that can be handled, even if they are nowadays rather large (e.g. more than 10^{20} states (Burch et al., 1992)). However, because the resources as defined in Definition 4 are independent of each other, finding S_g can be done in a modular way.

For each specification, start by identifying which resources it involves by looking at the state variables that are referenced in the specification. Always group resources that share a variable. Construct a TS containing the state variables and transitions contained in each involved resource. Additionally, reverse (i.e. make them go backwards) all the automatic and effect transitions and add them to the set of backwards uncontrollable transitions (**buc** in Listing 2).

The generated guard expressions are valid only within the states defined by $S - S_x$. As such, the allowed initial states of each resource need to be updated to also reflect the new forbidden states found for each specification. Updating of the individual resources with new guards and initial states is similar to the normalization procedure performed in Mohajerani et al. (2016).

5. APPLICATION: ASSEMBLY STATION

Fig. 1 shows an assembly station where a human operator and a collaborative robot work together to mount parts on a diesel engine. The collaborative robot hangs from the ceiling, together with some tools that can be attached via a tool changer attached to the robot. This section highlights how guard extraction was used as a modeling and control tool during the implementation of this demonstrator by showing how it was applied to model this changing of tools.



Fig. 1. Collaborative robot assembly station. Cutout at the top right highlights the tool docking mechanism. Video available at <https://youtu.be/TK1Mb38xiQ8>

The robot (from here, the *ur10*), the tool changer (*rsp*), and a gripping tool (*tool*) are all modeled as individual resources.

To ease notation, we use a notation in which measured state variables are denoted with a subscript “?”, command state variables are denoted with a subscript “!”, and estimated state variables are denoted with a hat – see Table 1.

Table 1.

$v_?$	measured state variables
$v_!$	command state variables
\hat{v}	estimated state variables

Table 1: Notation for the three different types of a resource state variable v .

The *tool* can open and close based on a digital output, $o_!$, which opens the gripper when high and closes it when low. The *tool* has sensors for knowing whether its opened ($o_?$) or closed ($c_?$). A resource t modeling the *tool* is defined as $r_t = \langle \{c_?, o_?\}, \{c_!, o_!\}, \emptyset, O_d, I_d \rangle$. The allowed initial states I_d are all states where the opened and closed sensors are not active at the same time. O_d contains two abilities, **close** and **open**. These are expressed in terms of the *tool* resource state. Table 2 shows the transitions of the **close** and **open** abilities respectively. The type column denotes whether the predicate and action function make up a deliberation (d), automatic (a), or effect (e) transition. To save space, we allow to put named predicates in the

tables. These are denoted by rows with “-” for the action functions and the type.

Table 2.

predicate	action functions	type
$enabled : \neg o_?$	$o_1 := true$	d
$executing : o_1 \wedge \neg o_?$	$o_? := true, c_? := false$	e
$finished : o_1 \wedge o_?$	-	-
$enabled : \neg c_?$	$o_1 := false$	d
$executing : \neg o_1 \wedge \neg c_?$	$o_? := false, c_? := true$	e
$finished : \neg o_1 \wedge c_?$	-	-

Table 2: The transitions and named predicates making up the **open** (top), and **close** (bottom) abilities.

Next, the *rsp* resource is modeled. The *rsp* has two command variables, $l_1 \in \{false, true\}$ and $u_1 \in \{false, true\}$, requesting whether it should be locked or unlocked. The *rsp* locking mechanism does not have a sensor, but it keeps its state even if powered off so as not to drop any currently held tools, and therefore the state of it must be *estimated*. To keep track of whether it is locked or not, the resource includes an estimated state variable $\hat{l} \in \{unknown, false, true\}$. The *rsp* can be locked even though it is already locked, to put it in a known state, which also applies to unlocking.

The resource r defining the *rsp* can then be defined as $r_r = \langle \emptyset, \{l_1, u_1\}, \{\hat{l}\}, O_r, I_r \rangle$. I_r contains all states where $\hat{l} = unknown$. Table 3 shows the abilities for locking and unlocking the tool changer.

Table 3.

predicate	actions functions	type
$enabled : \hat{l} \neq true$	$l_1 := true, u_1 := false, \hat{l} := true$	d
$finished : \hat{l} = true$	-	-
$enabled : \hat{l} \neq false$	$l_1 := false, u_1 := true, \hat{l} := false$	d
$finished : \hat{l} = false$	-	-

Table 3: The transitions and named predicates making up the **lock** and **unlock** abilities of the *rsp* resource.

The *ur10* can be in one of $P \in \{p_0, p_1\}$ predefined poses. A resource u is defined for the *ur10* as follows: $r_u = \langle \{p_?, m_?\}, \{gp_?\}, \{\hat{lp}\}, O_u, I_u \rangle$, where $p_?$ is the measured robot position, $m_? \in \{false, true\}$ is a measure of whether the robot is moving or stationary, $gp_?$ is its goal position and \hat{lp} is the last known observed position. Table 4 shows the **move_to_p0** ability of the *ur10* resource. Corresponding abilities exist for each target position of the robot.

Table 4.

predicate	actions functions	type
$enabled : p_? \neq p_0 \wedge gp_? \neq p_0$	$gp_? := p_0$	d
$starting : p_? \neq p_0 \wedge gp_? = p_0 \wedge \neg m_?$	$m_? := true$	e
$executing : gp_? = p_0 \wedge p_? \neq p_0 \wedge m_?$	$p_? := p_0, m_? := false$	e
$finished : gs_? = p_0$	$lp := p_0$	a

Table 4: The transitions and named predicates making up the **move_to_p0** ability of the *ur10* resource.

In order to model the interaction between the *tool* and the *ur10*, an estimated state variable is introduced, $\hat{t} \in \{home, robot\}$.

\hat{t} is updated by the transitions defined in Table 5. When the robot is at p_0 and the *rsp* is unlocked, the *tool* is considered to be at the home position and when the robot is at p_0 and the *rsp* is locked, the *tool* is considered to be attached to the robot.

Table 5.

predicate	action functions	type
$\hat{t} = robot \wedge p_? = p_0 \wedge \neg \hat{l}$	$\hat{t} := home$	a
$\hat{t} = home \wedge p_? = p_0 \wedge \hat{l}$	$\hat{t} := robot$	a

Table 5: Two automatic transitions for keeping track of the tool position.

It is now possible to define two *planning operations*, one for taking the *tool* and one for putting it back, while also moving the robot to p_1 . We define **TakeTool** to have the precondition $\hat{t} = home$ and the goal state $\hat{t} = robot \wedge p_? = p_1$, as well as **LeaveTool** with the precondition $\hat{t} = robot$ and the goal state $\hat{t} = home \wedge p_? = p_1$. The desired outcome is described in Fig. 2, which shows two possible plans for executing the planning operations.




Fig. 2. Two plans arising from the intent of taking and putting back the tool illustrated beside the respective planning operation. In the **TakeTool** case, the *rsp* is initially unlocked, the *tool* is closed (hanging at the stand) and the robot is at p_1 . In the **LeaveTool** case, the *tool* is initially closed and attached to the robot (i.e. *rsp* is locked), the *ur10* is in p_1 , and the *rsp* is locked.

While it is easy to model in the level of abstraction provided by the planning operations, to get the behavior shown in Fig. 2, additional specifications are needed in order to ensure proper interaction between the resources.

5.1 Ensuring invariant propositions via additional guards

If the *tool* is attached to the robot, it should not be possible to move the robot between poses p_0 and p_1 unless the *tool* is open. This can be expressed as specification A: $\hat{t} = robot \wedge \hat{p} = p_0 \wedge ur10.move_to_p1.executing \Rightarrow tool.open.finished$ as well as specification B: $\hat{t} = robot \wedge \hat{p} = p_1 \wedge ur10.move_to_p0.executing \Rightarrow tool.open.finished$.

Similarly, if the *tool* is at the tool stand, it should not be possible to move from pose p_1 to p_0 unless the *rsp* is unlocked, or the tool changer will collide with the *tool*. This can be expressed as specification C: $\hat{t} = home \wedge ur10.move_to_p0.executing \Rightarrow rsp.unlock.finished$.

If the robot is holding the tool, the *rsp* is not allowed to unlock to release the tool unless the robot is at p_0 and the gripper has closed (thus holding on to the tool stand). This is specification D: $\hat{t} = robot \wedge rsp.unlock.finished \Rightarrow p_? = p_0 \wedge tool.close.finished$.

Finally, if the *tool* is at the tool stand, the gripper must not be allowed to open. E: $\hat{t} = home \Rightarrow tool.close.finished$.

5.2 Guard extraction results

To perform guard extraction by reverse reachability from forbidden states, the negation of each specification are disjuncted to form a Boolean function representing all forbidden state combinations. Then the guard extraction algorithm described previously can be applied to the TS created from the resources, their initial states and the set of forbidden states. The generated guards can be seen in Table 6.

Table 6.

ability	new guard
ur10.move_to_p0	$\neg o_1 \wedge \neg o_2 \wedge \neg \hat{l} \vee o_1 \wedge o_2 \wedge \hat{l}$
ur10.move_to_p1	$\neg o_1 \wedge \neg o_2 \wedge \neg \hat{l} \wedge \hat{l} = \text{home} \vee o_1 \wedge o_2 \wedge \hat{l} \wedge \hat{l} = \text{robot}$
rsp.lock	$p_? = p_0 \wedge p_1 = p_0 \vee \hat{l} = \text{robot} \vee p_? = p_0 \wedge \hat{l} p = p_1 \vee p_? = p_1 \wedge p_1 = p_1$
rsp.unlock	$\neg o_1 \wedge \hat{l} = \text{home} \vee \neg o_1 \wedge c_? \wedge p_? = p_0 \wedge p_1 = p_0$
tool.open	$\hat{l} \wedge \hat{l} = \text{robot}$
tool.close	$p_? = p_0 \wedge p_1 = p_0 \vee p_? = p_0 \wedge \hat{l} p = p_1 \vee p_? = p_1 \wedge \hat{l} p = p_0 \vee p_? = p_1 \wedge p_1 = p_1$

Table 6: Produced guards for the *deliberation* transitions of respective ability.

With the new guards (and the new initial states of the resources, not shown here), the set of safe states S_g contain 1056 states. The computed guards, while certainly not impossible to understand, are arguably more complex than the specifications A-E provided above, which each solve a distinct problematic interaction. With the computed guards added back to the resource's deliberation transitions, the control system will now produce plans according to Fig. 2. While the above example may seem trivial, it is actually a quite tricky situation due to the interconnected resources.

6. CONCLUSION

At the surface, some specifications seem very easy to get rid of by simply modifying the involved resources. However, one needs to remember that the discrete descriptions of the resources are just one part of a larger collection of driver code, simulation representations etc. Ideally the resource definitions should not need to be changed.

Additionally, it may seem limiting to only be able to specify invariant propositions, however when combined with the notion of uncontrollable transitions, we have found that in practice, this comes a long way towards expressing the most common safety specifications.

The method outlined here does not take into account global specifications – each specification is handled only for the involved resources (in the example above the three resources are interconnected and treated as one). This means that other types of verification need to be performed after the guard extraction has been performed. For example, it is essential to check that whenever a precondition of a planning operation is satisfied, there must exist at least one path leading to the goal state of the operation. This highlights the fact that the guard extraction is just one of many tools that can be used to ensure high quality automation solutions. Perhaps the biggest advantage to applying guard extraction lies in its simplicity – because it only modifies the guards of the original resources, it can easily coexist with both traditional model checking and planning systems.

In this work the resources and specifications are grouped in a very conservative way. Future work will involve looking into better ways to create the sub-problems solved to find the set of safe states by inspecting the transitions involved.

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