Efficient Communication via Reinforcement Learning

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Abstract

Why do languages partition mental concepts into words the way they do? Recent works have taken an information-theoretic view on human language and suggested that it is shaped by the need for efficient communication (Regier et al., 2015; Gibson et al., 2017; Zaslavsky et al., 2018). This means that human language is shaped by a simultaneous pressure for being informative, while also being simple in order to minimize the cognitive load.

In this thesis we combine the information-theoretic perspective on language with recent advances in deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. We explore how efficient communication emerges between two artificial agents in a signaling game as a by-product of them maximizing a shared reward signal. This is tested in the domain of colors and numeral systems, two domains in which human languages tend to support efficient communication (Zaslavsky et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2020). We find that the communication developed by the artificial agents in these domains shares characteristics with human languages when it comes to efficiency and structure of semantic partitions, even though the agents lack the full perceptual and linguistic architecture of humans.

Our results offer a computational learning perspective that may complement the information-theoretic view on the structure of human languages. The results also suggest that reinforcement learning is a powerful and flexible framework that can be used to test and generate hypotheses in silico.

Keywords: Cognitive Science, Efficient Communication, Emergent Communication, Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.
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Emil Carlsson
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List of Publications

This thesis is based on the following appended papers:


The following publication has been made during this time but is not part of this thesis:

II  Appended papers

1  A reinforcement-learning approach to efficient communication
   27

2  Learning Approximate and Exact Numeral Systems via Reinforcement Learning
   55
Part I

Introductory chapters
Chapter 1

Introduction

The ability to efficiently communicate and coordinate with each other in order to solve common tasks is one of the keys behind the success of the human species. Due to this, learning to communicate and coordinate efficiently via interactions, rather than relying on supervision and possibly hand-crafted communication protocols, is often seen as a pre-requisite for developing AI agents able to have more advanced interactions with humans and other artificial agents.

In this thesis we bring together two strands of research. We explore how efficient communication emerges in multi-agent reinforcement learning, with focus on the fundamental trade-off between complexity and informativeness of communication strategies that underlie an information-theoretic view of the structure of natural languages (Regier, Kemp, et al., 2015; Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al., 2017; Zaslavsky et al., 2018). This view suggests that human languages are shaped by a simultaneous pressure for being informative, to enable efficient communication, while also being simple in order to minimize the cognitive load.

Recent research has made it increasingly apparent that deep reinforcement learning serves as a powerful tool to develop interacting agents able to efficiently act in their corresponding environments (Mnih et al., 2013; Silver, Huang, et al., 2016). As a result, research on communication in multi-agent systems has moved towards a goal-based paradigm, using reinforcement learning, for developing communication (Foerster et al., 2016; Jorge et al., 2016; Mordatch et al., 2018). This paradigm goes back to first principles, here the communication is formed out of necessity and shaped by a reward signal. In this way agents develop a language grounded in the environment and given task.

In addition, the growing body of work connecting standard reinforcement learning techniques to neuroscience (Niv et al., 2005; Schulz et al., 2019; Dabney et al., 2020; Eckstein et al., 2020) and the fact that the fields of artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neuroscience are converging to the shared view on computational intelligence, suggests for valuable cross-disciplinary exchanges when it comes to research questions and methods (Gershman et al., 2015). Especially, studying how communication emerges in deep learning agents might shed light on human language evolution. At the same time borrowing ideas from the extensive literature on human language and communication found in cognitive science (Regier, Kemp, et al., 2015;
Goodman et al., 2016) might provide us with new insights in how to design artificial agents able to use language in a functional and goal-driven way.

The main contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows.

- We complement the information-theoretic view with a learning perspective suggesting reinforcement learning as a plausible mechanistic explanation of the efficiency phenomena found in language.
- We also make a methodological contribution by showing how reinforcement learning can be used to explore the emergence of universals and variations in language.
- From a practical viewpoint our results add to the growing evidence that reinforcement learning can be used to design interactive agents with a language grounded in the current environment and given task.

The thesis is structured in the following way. In Chapter 2 we will introduce the concepts and topics necessary for understanding the models and results presented throughout the thesis. In Chapter 3 we present brief summaries of the results presented in the included papers, Kågebäck et al. (2020) (Paper 1) and Carlsson et al. (2021) (Paper 2). This is followed by concluding remarks and a discussion about possible future directions in Chapter 4. The second part of the thesis contains the included papers.

In Paper 1 we explore how efficient communication emerge in a dyad of artificial agents playing a signaling game where to goal is to communicate a certain color tile from the Munsell chart used in the World Color Survey (Kay et al., 2014). The resulting artificial languages are compared to human languages when it comes to efficiency and structure. Especially, the artificial languages are evaluated using the information-theoretic frameworks of Regier, Kemp, et al. (2015) and Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al. (2017).

Paper 2 builds on the framework developed in Paper 1 and we explore how efficient numeral systems emerges via interaction and reinforcement learning. The results are compared to the results for the human numeral systems studied in Xu et al. (2020).
Chapter 2

Background

The following chapter introduces the concepts and topics used throughout the thesis. We start by introducing the signaling game used in both Paper 1 and Paper 2 along with an introduction to efficient communication. We then introduce the necessary concepts from the reinforcement learning literature.

Figure 2.1: Illustration of the signaling game studied in Paper 1 and Paper 2. The sender wants to communicate the state $s$ by sending the utterance $w$. Given the utterance $w$, the listener produces a reconstruction $s'$ and a shared reward, $r(s, s')$, based on how well the listener reconstructed $s$ is given to both agents. This game can be seen as an instance of the POMDP model studied in reinforcement learning (defined in Section 2.2.1.)

2.1 Signaling Game

In this thesis we will study how communication emerges between two agents playing a Lewis signaling game (Lewis, 1969) consisting of a sender agent and a listener agent. The game consists of a space of possible states $S$ and a vocabulary, or set of utterances, $W$. In each round of the game a state, $s \in S$, is sampled from $S$ according to some need probability $p(s)$ and provided to the sender agent. The goal of the sender is to convey to state $s$ to the listener by producing an utterance $w \in W$. 
Upon receiving the utterance $w$ the listener produces a guess about the state $s'$ and a shared reward, $r(s, s')$, is given to both agents depending on how well the listener reconstructed the target state $s$. The game is schematically described in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.2: The different communication channels used throughout the thesis. In the discrete channel a message is simply an index or a one-hot encoded vector indicating which element in the vocabulary the sender is using. With a continuous channel a sender can convey a convex combination of the different elements available in the vocabulary and we will consider a noisy channel where Gaussian noise is added to the message before reaching the listener.

### 2.1.1 Channels

Moreover, we will explore two different types of messages produced by the sender. The first type is discrete messages, which we use in both Paper 1 and Paper 2, where the vocabulary $\mathcal{W}$ is a finite set of elements and the sender conveys one of these elements in each round. In Paper 1 we also explore a version of the game where $\mathcal{W}$ corresponds to the probability simplex and the utterances are continuous vectors. We can think of each continuous utterance $w$ as a convex combination of discrete utterances. The continuous utterance $w$ is perturbed with Gaussian noise

$$\hat{w} = w + \eta, \; \eta \sim N(0, \sigma)$$

before reaching the listener and the discreteness of the communication emerges as a mean to ensure robust communication in the noisy environment. See Figure 2.2 for an illustration of the two different communication channels.

### 2.1.2 Efficient Communication: A Theoretical Framework

We adopt an information-theoretic view on communication (Regier, Kemp, et al., 2015; Kemp et al., 2018; Gibson, Futrell, S. P. Piantadosi, et al., 2019) with steams from the classical setup of Claude Shannon(Shannon, 1948). This view is schematically captured in Figure 2.1 where a sender wants to convey the state of the world, $s$, over
a possibly noisy channel to the listener. Though the goal is to perfectly transmit the state \( s \), this might be impossible in practice due to noise, constraints on the vocabulary and a possible infinitely sized state-space \( S \). It is therefore meaningful to talk about the communication cost of a sender-listener pair as a measure of how much information is lost about the state \( s \) in expectation due the constraints on the communication.

Figure 2.3: The fundamental trade-off between communication cost and complexity. Human semantic systems tend to lie close to the optimal frontier.

One measure of communication cost commonly used (Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al., 2017) is the expected surprise defined as

\[
E^{ES} = - \sum_{s,w} p(s) S(w|s) \log L(s|w)
\]  

where \( S(w|s) \) denotes the probability that the sender uses the utterance \( w \) given the state \( s \) and \( L(s|w) \) the probability that the listener produces the guess \( s \) given the utterance \( w \). The expected surprise can be seen as a measure of the surprise incurred by the listener when the actual state the sender tried to communicate by \( w \) was revealed.

A related measure of communication cost is the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) between a sender \( S(s) \) and listener \( L(s|w) \)

\[
KL(S(s)||L(s|w)) = \sum_s S(s) \log \frac{S(s)}{L(s|w)}
\]

which measures the extra uncertainty about the state \( s \) experienced by the listener when hearing the utterance \( w \) compared to the uncertainty the sender carries about the state \( S(s) \). If we assume the sender to be certain about which state it want to
communicate, i.e. the sender distribution satisfies $S(s) = 1$ for some state $s$, and that the sender has all its probability mass concentrated at some utterance $w$, the KL-divergence reduces to

$$KL(S(s)||L(s|w)) = -\log L(s|w)$$

and the expected communication cost becomes

$$E^{KL} = -\sum_s p(s) \log L(s|w).$$

The reader should note that given sender certainty the $E^{KL}$ is a special case of $E^{ES}$ where we consider a mode sender.

In an information-theoretic sense, an efficient language should minimize the communication cost while being as simple as possible, i.e. keeping the complexity of the language as small as possible. Here we will measure the complexity of a language as the size of the vocabulary $W$ and an optimal language will be a language achieving the smallest communication cost possible given a certain size of the vocabulary, see Figure 2.3.

**Efficiency Shapes Human Language**

A growing body of work suggests human language is shaped by the need for efficiency (Kemp et al., 2018; Gibson, Futrell, S. P. Piantadosi, et al., 2019). As stated previously this boils down to a fundamental trade-off between informativeness and complexity, see Figure 2.3. For example Regier, Kemp, et al. (2015), Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al. (2017), and Zaslavsky et al. (2018) suggest color systems found in human languages to be optimized for efficient communication, while Xu et al. (2020) show that numeral systems across languages support efficient communication. In addition, information-theoretic principles seem to not only underpin semantic representations but have also been shown to account for world-length (S. T. Piantadosi et al., 2011), syntactic comprehension (Levy, 2008) and pragmatic language understanding (Peloquin et al., 2020) to mention a few.

**2.2 Reinforcement Learning**

Reinforcement learning is a paradigm of machine learning concerned with designing interactive and goal-oriented agents seeking to maximize their cumulative reward in their environments (Sutton et al., 1998). This computational approach to learning via interactions differs from the classical *supervised learning* paradigm in the sense that the agent does not have access to examples labelled by some external expert and must instead gather its own dataset to learn from by interacting with the environment. This is often modelled as a feedback loop, see Figure 2.4, where an agent at time $t$ observes the state $s_t$ and takes an action $a_t$, using some policy $\pi(a_t|s_t)$, which is sent to the environment. The environment responds with yielding a new state $s_{t+1}$ and an immediate reward $r_t$. This dynamics give rise to a notoriously hard challenge.
for a reinforcement learning agent, namely the exploration-exploitation tradeoff. In order to obtain a large amount of reward an agent needs to prefer playing actions known to yield much reward, i.e. the agent needs to *exploit* its current knowledge of the environment to maximize the reward. However, to acquire this knowledge in the first place, an agent needs to *explore* actions it is uncertain about in order to gain more information about the environment. In many tasks neither exploration nor exploitation can be pursued separately and an agent needs to balance between them and slowly move towards more preferable actions.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 2.4: Illustration of a reinforcement learning agent interacting with an environment. At time $t$ the agent takes an action $a_t$ and observes a new state $S_{t+1}$ along with an immediate reward $r_t$.

In the context of our signaling game, we will denote sender policy for producing an utterance $w$ given a state $s$ as $\pi_S(w|s)$ and this will be a mapping on the form

$$\pi_S : S \rightarrow \Delta(W) \quad (2.4)$$

where $\Delta(W)$ denotes the set of probability distributions over the vocabulary $W$. The listener policy for producing a reconstruction $s'$ given $w$ will be written as $\pi_L(s'|w)$ and will be a mapping from

$$\pi_L : W \rightarrow \Delta(S) \quad (2.5)$$

where $\Delta(S)$ is the set of probability distributions over the $S$.

### 2.2.1 Markov Decision Process

The interaction between the agent and the environment is usually modelled as a *Markov decision process* (MDP) (Bellman, 1957). A MDP is a tuple $(S, A, P, R)$ where

- $S$ denotes the set of possible states.
• \(A\) denotes the set of possible actions available to the agent.

• \(P(s_{t+1}|s_t, a_t)\) denotes the transition probability from state \(s_t\) to state \(s_{t+1}\) given the action \(a_t\).

• \(R(a_t, s_t)\) denotes the possibly stochastic reward function associated with taking action \(a_t\) given state \(s_t\).

In the MDP framework it is assumed that the environment satisfies the Markov property, which means that the transition, \(P\), and reward, \(R\), are conditionally independent of previous actions and states given the current state and action \((s, a)\). Hence, only the current state of the world matters for future rewards.

An extension of the MDP framework of importance for this work is the partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) (Åström, 1965). In the POMDP model the dynamics are assumed to follow an MDP but the agent does not have full knowledge about the state of the environment and only partially observes the state.

Returning to the signaling game defined in Section 2.1, from each agent’s point of view the game can be modelled as a 1-step POMDP, which refers to the fact that the game terminates after one step and that we do not have to care about the transition probability. From the sender’s perspective the state of the environment consists of the observed state \(s\) and the unobserved listener model, \(\pi_L(s'|w)\). The action set of the sender is simply the vocabulary \(W\). In contrast, from the listener’s point of view the observed part of the state consists of the utterance \(w\) produced by the sender, while the state \(s\) and the actual sender model, \(\pi_S(w|s)\), are unobserved. The effect of this is that the environment becomes non-stationary for the agents which might have negative impact on the learning.

It is common in multi-agent reinforcement learning to, from one agent’s perspective, treat the other agents as part of the environment (Gronauer et al., 2021) and this approach has provided a simple way to successfully train agents on various communication tasks (Havrylov et al., 2017; Chaabouni et al., 2021). However, we humans are able to practise deep and recursive reasoning about others before we act in an environment (Hedden et al., 2002; Goodman et al., 2016). Achieving similar behaviour in artificial agents seems like a very interesting research direction and is something we will elaborate more on in Chapter 4 where we discuss possible future directions.

### 2.2.2 Q-Learning

In Paper 2 we use a standard model-free reinforcement learning technique called Q-learning (Watkins et al., 1992). In Q-learning an agent keeps an estimate of the Q-value, or expected discounted utility, for each state-action pair \((s, a)\). In our signaling game this means that the sender keeps an estimate of expected utility of conveying \(w\) given each state \(s\)

\[
Q_S(s, w) = \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim \pi_L(s'|w)}[r(s, s')] 
\] (2.6)
while the listener keeps an estimate of the expected utility of producing $s'$ given $w$

$$Q_L(w, s') = \mathbb{E}_{w \sim \pi_S(w|s)}[r(s, s')].$$

(2.7)

We will parametrize both $Q_S$ and $Q_L$ as neural networks and update them by minimizing the mean-squared error (MSE) between the predicted utility and actual reward using stochastic gradient descent over a batch of size $m$.

$$\text{MSE}_S = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} (Q_S(s_i, w_i) - r_i)^2,$$

(2.8)

$$\text{MSE}_L = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} (Q_L(w_i, s'_i) - r_i)^2.$$

(2.9)

### Dropout as a Bayesian Approximation

A common policy used in Q-learning is the well-known $\epsilon$-greedy strategy where the agent with probability $\epsilon$ plays an action uniformly and with probability $1 - \epsilon$ plays the action with largest Q-value (Sutton et al., 1998, Ch: 6). However, this method leaves room for improvement regarding adaptively balancing the exploration-exploitation trade-off and in Paper 2 we will use a more sophisticated method with a Bayesian flavour to it. More precisely, we will leverage that the regularization technique dropout can be seen as a Bayesian approximation (Gal et al., 2015).

Dropout refers to a technique where hidden neurons in the neural networks are ignored, i.e. forced to be 0, with some probability $p$ (Srivastava et al., 2014). By using dropout and passing the same state $s$ though the neural network several times one can estimate the agents uncertainty about the Q-values and the network can be seen as an approximate posterior over the true Q-values given the data (Gal et al., 2015). We construct a policy by sampling plausible Q-values from the network, i.e. we make one pass through the network, and then act greedy w.r.t. sampled values. This approach is known as Thompson sampling in the machine learning literature (Thompson, 1933) and has for example been used to handle exploration in deep contextual bandits (Riquelme et al., 2018). Lately, it has also been shown that Thompson sampling shares characteristics with exploration strategies used by humans in various bandit tasks (Schulz et al., 2019).

### 2.2.3 Policy Optimization

An alternative to Q-learning is to directly optimize the policy $\pi_\theta$ parametrized by some $\theta$ (Sutton et al., 1998, Ch: 13). If we let $\theta$ be the parametrization of the sender policy and $\phi$ the parametrization of the listener we can write the joint objective function as

$$J(\theta, \phi) = \sum_{s, w, s'} p(s)\pi_{S,\theta}(w|s)\pi_{L,\phi}(s'|w)r(s, s').$$

(2.10)

\[^1\text{Note that in our setup the temporal difference error (Sutton et al., 1998, Ch:6) reduces to the MSE between the predicted utility and actual reward.}\]
The gradients of $J$ w.r.t. $\theta$ and $\phi$ can be written as

\[
\nabla_\theta J(\theta, \phi) = \mathbb{E}[Q_{L,\phi}(s, w) \nabla_\theta \log \pi_{S,\theta}(w|s)]
\]

\[
\nabla_\phi J(\theta, \phi) = \mathbb{E}[Q_{S,\theta}(w, s') \nabla_\phi \log \pi_{L,\phi}(s'|w)].
\]

(2.11)\hspace{1cm} (2.12)

where $Q_{L,\phi}(s, w)$ is the expected utility of uttering $w$ given the state $s$ according to the listener distribution

\[
Q_{L,\phi}(s, w) = \sum_{s'} \pi_{L,\phi}(s'|w)r(s, s').
\]

(2.13)

and $Q_{S,\theta}(w, s')$ the expected utility of producing the state $s'$ given the utterance $w$

\[
Q_{S,\theta}(w, s') = \sum_{s} p(s) \pi_{S,\theta}(w|s)r(s, s').
\]

(2.14)

A common approach is to estimate $Q_L$ and $Q_S$ by taking the mean reward over a batch of data. This results in the classical algorithm REINFORCE (Williams, 1992) adapted to our signaling game. We use this approach to train the agents in Paper 1.
Chapter 3

Summary of Papers

This chapter provides brief summaries of the papers appended to this thesis.

3.1 Paper 1: A reinforcement-learning approach to efficient communication.

In this work we present a computational approach to partitioning semantic spaces using deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. Two agents play a Lewis signaling game together where the goal is to communicate a certain color in a noisy environment. We successfully demonstrate that artificial agents can, via reinforcement learning, come to an agreement on how to partition a semantic space, i.e. creating their own artificial language. The main contribution of this paper is a complementary insight to the approach of Regier, Kemp, et al. (2015), Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al. (2017), and Zaslavsky et al. (2018) by illustrating how a computational learning mechanism accounts for near-optimal color partitions in an information-theoretic sense.

The color given to the sender agent will be sampled from the Munsell Chart used in the World Color Survey (Kay et al., 2014), see Figure 3.1, and represented as

![Munsell chart](image)

Figure 3.1: The Munsell chart used in Paper 1. The sender observes a one of the color chips from the chart and wants to communicate it to the listener.

a three-dimensional vector in the CIELAB space. The reward will be based on a perceptual similarity measure (Regier, Kay, et al., 2007) between the target color \( c \) and the listener reconstruction \( c' \)

\[
r(c, c') = e^{-0.001||x_c - x_{c'}||^2_2}.
\] (3.1)

We can think of this reward as a sender and listener solving a co-operative task where they need to communicate about colors. The success of the task depends on how well the listener is able to approximate the color the sender had in mind. Thus, it is reasonable to assume this reward to be proportional to the similarity between the true color and the approximation.

The agents were trained using the reinforcement learning method REINFORCE (Williams, 1992), using both a discrete and continuous communication channels, over a sequence of signaling games. After training the agents were evaluated using the information-theoretic frameworks of Regier, Kemp, et al. (2015) and Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al. (2017) along with using the well-formedness criterion from Regier, Kay, et al. (2007).

Figure 3.2: Figure taken from Kågebäck et al. (2020). WCS stands for the results of the languages from the World Color Survey and CIELAB correlation clustering is an approximation of the optimal frontier. We observe that reinforcement learning yields an efficiency in parity with what is found in the human languages studied. The errorbars corresponds to ±1 standard deviation.

We found that the communication of the artificial agents replicates important aspects of human color communication even though the agents lack the full perceptual and linguistic architecture of human language users. To be more specific our results indicates that the efficiency of the artificial communication matches the efficiency of human languages on the same color task. This can be seen in Figure 3.2 where the efficiency of the reinforcement learning agents follows the curve for the languages in the World Color Survey (WCS).
Our study also indicates that environmental noise plays an important role in the complexity of the resulting language. A noisy environment produces a pressure for low complexity solutions while a less noisy environment seems to lead to more complex communication. Interestingly, we also found that training with a noisy channel seems to yield similar results as training with a completely discrete channel.

3.2 Paper 2: Learning Approximate and Exact Numeral Systems via Reinforcement Learning

In this paper we study how efficient approximate and exact numeral systems emerge via reinforcement learning. A recent paper by Xu et al. (2020) illustrates that human numeral systems show support for efficient communication, and our main contribution in this paper is to show that reinforcement learning leads to efficient partitioning of the number line. A motivation for using reinforcement learning in this domain is the work of O’Shaughnessy et al. (2021) which highlights the importance of social and economic factors for the construction of numeral systems. The reward functions in our work can be considered as proxies for different culturally specific goals that the agents want to achieve.

We trained the agents using Q-learning with a Bayesian exploration scheme. The agents were trained during a sequence of signaling games where the goal was to communicate a certain number from the set $[1, 20]$. The numbers where sampled using various priors inferred from human data, e.g. the power-law prior considered in Xu et al. (2020) which was derived from the Google Ngram data (Michel et al., 2011). After training, we computed approximate systems by considering the resulting sender distributions, and the exact systems were derived from taking the mode of the sender distributions. We compared the efficiency of the artificial numeral systems with the languages studied in Xu et al. (2020). We considered several different reward functions

$$1 - \frac{|n - n'|}{20},$$

$$\left(1 + |n - n'|\right)^{-1},$$

$$e^{-|n-n'|},$$

and as in Paper 1 we can think of this as two agents solving a common task where the sender needs to communicate a quantity to the listener. The different reward functions can be viewed as different pressures for how precise the listener’s reconstruction has to be for the task to succeed.

Our results indicate that reinforcement learning agents can develop efficient communication on the same parity as found in the languages studied in Xu et al. (2020). We observe that the agents tends to partition the number line in a similar fashion as the human languages as well.
In this paper we have focused on approximate and exact numeral systems and the partitioning of the number line. There are still many things to explore when it comes to reinforcement learning and numeral systems, and some examples are the development of recursive systems and approximate arithmetic.
Chapter 4

Concluding Remarks and Future Directions

In this chapter we present concluding remarks and some future research directions we find promising.

4.1 Concluding Remarks

We have shown that artificial agents trained using reinforcement learning can via interaction develop near-optimal communication by simply maximizing a shared reward signal. We have seen that the resulting communication share some characteristics with human communication on the same tasks without being explicitly programmed to do so. We can relate these findings to the *Reward is enough* hypothesis (Silver, Singh, et al., 2021) which suggests that

... the objective of maximising reward is enough to drive behaviour that exhibits most if not all attributes of intelligence that are studied in natural and artificial intelligence, including knowledge, learning, perception, social intelligence, language and generalisation.

We do not argue about the general scientific support of this hypothesis but we note that in our restricted setup, maximizing the reward signal seems to be enough in order drive agents towards a behaviour that exhibits some of the efficiency characteristics found in human semantic representation.

Moreover, we do not know what mechanisms led to the efficiency of human language but our results suggest reinforcement learning as one plausible mechanism contributing to this phenomenon. We thus offer a computational learning perspective that may complement the information-theoretic view on human semantic representation (Regier, Kemp, et al., 2015; Gibson, Futrell, Jara-Ettinger, et al., 2017; Zaslavsky et al., 2018).

From a practical perspective our results adds to the growing body of work illustrating how reinforcement learning can be used to design interactive agents with a language grounded in the current environment and given task (Lazaridou et al., 2020).
There are several limitations with our studies that may be interesting to explore in the future. The generalization abilities of the agents are overlooked in our work and this is important to address in order to create agents that can communicate over a range of related tasks. There are also many other aspects to language than partitioning concepts into words, where maybe the most striking characteristic of human language is compositionality, which is something we do not address here and is very interesting future direction. The Lewis signaling game used in this thesis serves as a powerful framework in order to isolate certain phenomena, but it is interesting to go beyond the signaling games and study how communication emerges in more advanced settings where planning is needed.

4.2 Future Directions

In the sections below we elaborate on a few interesting future directions.

4.2.1 Contextual Efficiency

In this thesis we have studied the efficiency of the communication w.r.t. the entire meaning space. That is, the efficiency has been analysed w.r.t. the listener’s distribution over all possible choices. In most real-world scenarios there are contextual clues that can be leveraged by the agents in order improve the efficiency of the communication. A prominent computational model for communication in context and pragmatic reasoning is the Rational Speech Act (RSA) (Frank et al., 2012). RSA agents recursively reason about each other’s policies, in a regularized best-response fashion, before acting.

An interesting future direction is to incorporate pragmatic reasoning in deep reinforcement learning agents. Some recent work has already been done on combining RSA and reinforcement learning(Kang et al., 2020; Ohmer et al., 2020). However, we still believe there are much to explore when it comes to combining pragmatic reasoning and reinforcement learning, for example regarding the learning dynamics and incorporating the structure of the environment into the reasoning process.

Equipping artificial agents with an explicit model for reasoning about other agents in the environment might also mitigate issues related to using single agent reinforcement learning algorithms in multi-agent environments. The reason is that the agent would be able to decouple the behavior of other agents from the stationary environment.

4.2.2 Generalization and Compositionality

A drawback with many of the works on reinforcement learning and efficient communication, including the work presented in this thesis, is that the generalization ability of the developed communication is overlooked. If we are interested in the design of interacting agents acting in more open-ended environments, the communication has to generalize beyond the training environment. In order to coordinate and communicate in novel environments, agents need to be able to combine already known
concepts and expressions in new ways, i.e. have a compositional language. We believe a prominent approach is to combine recent advances in neuro-symbolic programming (Parisotto et al., 2017; Ellis et al., 2020) and reinforcement learning in order to design agents with explainable, compositional and generalizable communication.

4.2.3 Efficient Learner and Regret Minimization

So far we have focused on the communication efficiency of agents in the sense of a trade-off between communication cost and complexity. However, as discussed in Hawkins et al. (2021) an efficient agent should be able to use flexible online learning in order to coordinate with new partners. Hence, an efficient agent should also be an efficient learner. To formalize the notion of efficient learner in the context of signaling games we believe that the multi-armed bandit framework is suitable (Lattimore et al., 2020).

A bandit problem usually consists of a agent, with a learning policy $\pi$, interacting with an a-priori unknown environment over a sequence of $T$ rounds. At each step $t > 0$ some side-information $x_t$ is revealed to the agent before it takes an action $a_t$ after which an immediate stochastic reward $r_t(a_t, x_t)$ is given to the agent. The performance of an agent is usually measured by the expected cumulative regret

$$R_T(\pi) = \mathbb{E}_\pi[\sum_{t=1}^{T} r_t^* - r_t] \quad (4.1)$$

where $r_t^*$ is the reward associated with the best action in expectation and $r_t$ the reward achieved by the agent. Thus, the cumulative regret becomes a measure of the price paid by the agent for not knowing in advance what the best action given $x_t$ is. Given a certain learning policy, $\pi$, one is often concerned with bounding the regret of $\pi$ like

$$l_T \leq R_T(\pi) \leq u_T(\pi) \quad (4.2)$$

where $l_T$ stands for a lower bound true for any policy and $u_T(\pi)$ stands for a upper bound specific for the policy $\pi$. The efficiency of a learner can be measured by the gap $u_T(\pi) - l_T$ where a smaller gaps indicates a more efficient learner. From an information-theoretic perspective the scaling of regret depends solely on the agent’s ability to extract useful information from the environment (Garivier et al., 2019).

The notion of expected cumulative regret gets a very natural interpretation in our signaling game as the price paid by an agent for not knowing the language of the other agent before interacting, i.e. the cumulative regret measures the total number of miscommunications over $T$ interactions. An interesting future direction is to study how the regret of different learning algorithms scales when an agent communicates with novel partners over a set of interactions and if pragmatic reasoning models, like the RSA, can theoretically and empirically improve the regret scaling of the agent.
Bibliography


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