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Activation of values and anchoring of beliefs: How contextually embedded individuals are inspired by an institutional entrepreneur

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ABSTRACT

This article explores individuals' motivation to alter workplace behaviour and enact institutional change. Through an exploitative abductive study of the early phases of Vision Zero, a Swedish road safety policy shift, this article uncovers the motivational factors among individuals who, early in the process, enlist support and become involved in efforts to break with existing expectations, norms and regulations despite contextual embeddedness. Drawing on the value-belief-norm theory, the results reveal that activation of personal values and anchoring of personal beliefs are key functions in mobilising the enactment of institutional change. These findings offer insights into individual-level processes for catalysing institutional entrepreneurship and contribute to the literature on value-driven behaviour, providing valuable lessons for policymakers and scholars in institutional entrepreneurship.

1. Introduction

It is argued that institutional entrepreneurs need to be skilled socially to craft and voice visions of imagined futures that other actors are inclined to endorse (e.g., Battilana et al., 2009; Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Garud et al., 2002; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Waldron et al., 2015). The notion is that institutional entrepreneurs deliberately use framings that resonate with existing interests, values and familiar structures (Colombero et al., 2021; Dorado, 2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Hemingway, 2005). However, previous literature describes this social skill from a sender perspective, meaning it primarily concerns the institutional entrepreneur. Not much attention has been paid to the receivers, i.e., the individuals who are inspired by an institutional entrepreneur to engage in efforts of institutional change.

Considering the complexity and the uncertainties associated with buying into efforts that break with existing workplace expectations, norms and regulations, there is a pressing need to increase the understanding of what motivates individuals to endorse visions of imagined futures and choose to take part in new value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change, despite their contextual embeddedness (Battilana et al., 2009; Dorado, 2005). Only when many make such a choice, the enactment of institutional change will eventually develop into a collective effort and diffuse throughout an organisational field (Lawrence et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

The aim of this study is thus to better understand how contextually embedded individuals are becoming inspired by an institutional entrepreneur to embrace a radical proposal for institutional change. The research question guiding this work is: What key individual-level conditions, such as psychological factors, motivate contextually embedded individuals to endorse institutional entrepreneurs' ideas and engage in new value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change? Value-driven workplace behaviour refers to discretionary actions and decisions by employees or leaders that are guided by personal values or morals rather than by policy, regulations or short-term financial gain.

To answer this question, this study utilises the case of Vision Zero, a Swedish road safety policy that has gained global recognition since its introduction in 1997 (Clarke, 2008; Corben et al., 2022; Kristianssen et al., 2018; Mendoza et al., 2017; Safarpour et al., 2020). Vision Zero is a particularly relevant case as it illustrates a progressive policy shift that was only possible after drastic changes to the prevailing road-safety-problem formulation, views on responsibilities and attitudes towards and between road users, all achieved with an emphasis on collective actions rather than through the imposition of strict regulations (Belin et al., 2012; Rosencrantz et al., 2007). Thus, the case shares many similarities with contemporary sustainability missions and other institutional changes within public organisations that must rely on

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collective efforts.

The results show that psychological factors, such as personal values, beliefs and norms, can explain contextually embedded individuals' motivation to engage in new value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change. Furthermore, by applying the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory (Stern et al., 1999) from the field of social psychology to a case of institutional entrepreneurship, this study shows that activation of personal values and anchoring of beliefs about new workplace behaviour are key conditions that explain how contextually embedded individuals are becoming inspired by an institutional entrepreneur to engage in new workplace behaviour and adopt to novel practices and technologies. The finding of activation of personal values and anchoring of beliefs is a novel contribution to the research that breaks with a strong institutional view and that examines actors positioned prominently within a field and who, despite their strong contextual embeddedness, enlist support for a vision of imagined futures (e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Rao et al., 2003). Thus, this article reveals a missing link in a causal chain of institutional change within public organisations.

1.1. A psychological perspective on value-driven workplace behaviour

To examine what key individual-level conditions motivate contextually embedded individuals to endorse institutional entrepreneurs' ideas and engage in new value-driven workplace behaviour, this study utilises an exploitative abductive approach (Bamberger, 2018). This approach includes a systematic collection of 'facts', which is followed by an attempt to identify and apply frameworks that can explain patterns in the collected facts. Accordingly, in this work, information about individuals' motivation to endorse Vision Zero and engage in new value-driven workplace behaviour was collected and compared with theories from social psychology.

According to social psychology literature, value-driven behaviour is grounded deep within a person's cognitive sphere, specifically personal values (J. I. M. De Groot & Steg, 2008; Schwartz, 2006; Steg et al., 2013). Somewhat simplified, and according to the VBN theory (Stern, 2000; Stern et al., 1999), personal values influence behaviour, and more so when they are mediated by personal beliefs and self-expected moral obligations, i.e., personal norms. Personal beliefs refer to the subjective idea of the probability of a specific relationship, such as the belief or denial that one's actions can contribute to achieving goals associated with a specific type of fulfilment. On the other hand, personal norms relate to feelings about moral obligations for acting on those goals (Thøgersen, 2006). In other words, they serve as an inner moral compass and represent our feelings of personal responsibility or moral obligation towards taking action (Schwartz, 1977, 2012; Stern et al., 1999).

However, personal values only influence behaviour if they are sufficiently central to a person's self-concept (Schwartz, 2012; Stern et al., 1999). Personal values must thus be permanently salient or become 'activated' to influence an individual's behaviour (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Salient personal values are always active, and they influence how an individual thinks and acts in most situations (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Other central values, however, may need to be activated. Activation can, of course, occur automatically, specifically when values are the primary focus of attention. Still, values can also be activated by prompts or cues in the exo-personal surroundings, i.e., everything external to a person's thoughts and beliefs (McKenzie-Mohr & Schultz, 2014). Prompts typically contain simple reminders rather than persuasive appeals (Schultz, 2014) and can be exposed to people intentionally (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). For example, it has been shown that successful institutional entrepreneurs are skilled socially (Dorado, 2013; Fligstein, 2001) and can, among other things, craft appealing visions that resonate with existing interests, values and familiar frames (Battilana et al., 2009; Maguire et al., 2004). Most likely, institutional entrepreneurs are thus good at exposing people to cues that activate specific personal values.

A person's behaviour at the workplace is, however, not solely influenced by personal values and beliefs. Contextual factors, such as organisational culture and structures, as well as collective aspects, including social norms, in-group behaviour and peer pressure (Gifford & Nilsson, 2014; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Stern, 2000), also play a role. Stern (2000) discusses the role of contextual factors in the VBN theory of environmentally significant behaviour and concludes that for expensive or complicated behaviours, personal capabilities and contextual factors are likely to account for the greater variance. Thus, as previous research in institutional entrepreneurship has pointed out, the responsibilities and authorities attached to professional roles, laws and regulations, social norms and expectations will be important factors for why individuals within an organisational field alter their value-driven behaviour to enact institutional change (e.g., Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Leca et al., 2008). As such, personal norms (i.e., our inner compass and self-concept) at the workplace are partly influenced by personal values and beliefs and partly by contextual factors, including the degree to which choices are or are not constrained by the nature of the professional role (Stryker & Serpe, 1994).

In its original version, the VBN theory explains various behavioural indicators of nonactivist environmentalism (Stern et al., 1999). It is a theory of pro-environmental behaviour connected to personal values, categorised as biospheric, altruistic or egoistic, where the latter is negatively correlated with indicators of environmentalism (Stern, 2000). In this study, personal values, beliefs and norms are expected to explain value-driven workplace behaviour, characterised by actions and decisions made by employees or leaders at their discretion. Hence, the VBN theory has been adjusted and transferred to the field of institutional entrepreneurship to explain the motivational factors influencing contextual embedded individuals' efforts to adopt Vision Zero.

The rest of this article is organised as follows. The next section outlines the research approach and method used to understand why and how individuals within an organisational field alter their behaviour to enact institutional change. Thereafter, the development and the initial establishment of Vision Zero are outlined, followed by the results. Subsequently, a VBN-inspired theoretical model is proposed to explain the motivational factors for engaging in new value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change. The article ends with conclusions and implications.

2. Research approach and method

To examine the motivational factors that drive individuals to adopt new value-driven behaviour aimed at enacting institutional change, this article includes a case study on the early development and implementation of Sweden's Vision Zero road safety policy. The case study explores how interviewees voiced their personal values and describes changes in their workplace behaviour to engage, at their discretion, in early efforts toward institutional change.

2.1. Research process

The study started with desktop research of collecting various types of reports and documents about the development and implementation of Vision Zero (see Table A.1). Descriptions of Vision Zero in these documents were linked in chronological order, describing the early phases of Vision Zero (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2019). These documents were also used to identify key individuals involved in leveraging resources to develop and implement Vision Zero and transform the existing road safety institution in Sweden (i.e., acting as institutional entrepreneurs, according to (Maguire et al., 2004)).

The identified individuals were contacted and invited to an interview. The interviews were semi-structured and used to collect individuals' narratives of the early phases of Vision Zero (Kvale et al., 2009). By using a snowballing technique, i.e., asking interviewees about who else was engaged in the early phases of Vision Zero, additional

individuals (i.e., individuals who were actively buying in and discretionally engaging in efforts to adapt to the progressive vision) were successively identified and included in the data collection. In total, 14 individuals were interviewed by the author between March and November 2021 (see Table 1). Interviewees are referred to according to their professional role and organisational affiliation at the time, due to one request for anonymity.

Interview data was transcribed and fed into the chronological description of the early phases of Vision Zero, developing this into an overlapping case narrative (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2019). This case narrative is presented in Section 3. The collected interview data was thereafter arranged and structured using a thematic analysis method (Braun & Clarke, 2006) (Table 3). This method is used to identify and report patterns within qualitative data. Interview transcripts were thus read multiple times. From the transcripts, recurring patterns and rationales across interviews were identified. Similarities regarding why individuals found Vision Zero important, how they reasoned about their own role and how they chose to act were coded into first-order concepts. These concepts were then grouped into second-order themes and aggregated dimensions (see Table 2), which are used in the proposed model (illustrated in Fig. 1).

2.2. Data collection and method of analysis

Reports and documents about the early development of Vision Zero were collected using databases for academic literature and public archival material (see **Table A.1**). Data from key individuals who had participated during the early phases of Vision Zero (see Table 1) was collected using semi-structured interviews including open-ended questions, allowing the interviewee to interpret questions, talk freely about the topic at hand, give extensive narrative answers and make 'think-aloud' contributions (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2019; Kvale et al., 2009). To prompt interviewees to develop rich narratives about why and how they chose to engage in efforts related to Vision Zero, open-ended questions such as 'What were your initial thoughts when you first heard about Vision Zero?', 'Why did you choose to engage in Vision Zero?' and 'What enabled you to engage with Vision Zero?' were used (see full interview guide in Appendix 1). The emerging overlapping case narrative (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2019) was also used for 'recall checks' during the interviews to ensure that essential parts of the interviewee's story were not missing and that 'events' were placed in chronological order (Kvale et al., 2009).

Due to Covid-19 restrictions, all interviews took place online, were recorded and transcribed. Since all interviews were conducted in Swedish, the quotes used in this article have been translated into English by the author.

Researchers in various fields have offered convincing evidence about the unreliability of individuals' witness accounts even after a couple of days. Using interview data about events occurring decades ago will thus likely include a large amount of recall biases and errors. However, recalling memories of why 'something felt good' is based on our personal values (Schwartz, 2006, 2012), and although personal values can shift over time (for example, due to extraordinary life events), they are considered cognitive constructs that are very stable over time (J. I. M. De Groot & Steg, 2008; Schwartz, 2012; Stern et al., 1999). Thus, it can be argued that the interviewees' memories about what *was important* for them and *why it felt right* to engage in Vision Zero are more reliable than

Table 1
List of interviewees. Roles and organisational affiliation refer to how the interviewees positioned themselves in relation to Vision Zero.

Interviewee	Organisational affiliation	Date of interview	Interview time
Director of Traffic Safety (ideator)	Swedish Road Administration	19 May 2021	60 min
Expert and researcher in road safety (A)	Swedish Road Administration	4 March 2021	104 min
Expert and researcher in road safety (B)	Swedish Road Administration	26 May 2021	37 min
Expert and researcher in road safety (C)	Self-employed inventor of safety technology and The Swedish Road Administration	21 May 2021	65 min
Strategist (A)	Swedish Transport Administration	4 March 2021	54 min
Strategist (B)	Swedish Transport Administration	12 October 2021	75 min
Expert Vehicles, Machines and Fuels	Swedish Transport Administration	4 March 2021	54 min
Project manager	Swedish Road Administration	10 November 2021	57 min
Regional Manager	Swedish Road Administration	9 November 2021	52 min
Planner (A)	Swedish Road Administration	3 June 2021	52 min
Planner (B)	Swedish Road Administration	22 June 2021	90 min
Minister of Communication	Department of Communication, Swedish Government	4 June 2021	54 min
Expert	Government Office Ministry of Trade and Industry, Swedish Government	1 June 2021	37 min
Political Expert Advisor	Government Office Ministry of Communication, Swedish Government	14 June 2021	27 min

Table 2
Data structure.

1st order concept	2nd order themes	Aggregated dimensions
– Easy to understand recommendations about possible actions – Science-based decision-making – Publicity in media – Ethical standpoints that resonate with personal values – New approach to road safety – Emphasis on collaboration – Attractive futures	Exo-personal cues	Activation – this is good!
– Well-being – Ensuring traffic safety – Bridge socioeconomic differences – Responsibility for other persons' lives – Improving road safety	Pro-social values	
– Satisfy one's own interests – Feeling confident – Being recognised	Self-oriented values	
– Written strategies and documents – Management and leaders' support – Colleagues – External to the organisation	Exo-personal sources of anchoring beliefs	Anchoring – is this right?
– Selfless beliefs – Extended role responsibility – Role fulfilment – Achievement	Personal beliefs	
– Self-imposed moral duty – Role-based norms – What others are doing – Perceived as acceptable or expected	Personal norms	
– Cognitive reframing – Practice development – Collaborative engagement – Sensemaking – Strategic and political alignment	New value-driven workplace behaviour	



Fig. 1. A VBN-inspired model of engaging in new value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change. Cloud illustrations exemplify conscious stances and questions. Everything outside the marking of the cognitive sphere is external to a person's thoughts and beliefs. Anchoring can thus encompass both a cognitive process of determining what is morally right and actions such as engaging with others or actively seeking information.

memories of what was once achieved. Memories based on personal values can, therefore, be considered more valid.

Studying events that took place decades ago presents the challenge of locating and interviewing key individuals who were involved at the time. In the case of Vision Zero, many participants had already been working for years when the initiative was proposed, particularly representatives of the Swedish Road Administration's top management. As a result, many had retired by the time this study was conducted, making it challenging to find and interview individuals who had been part of Vision Zero's early development. This not only risks reducing the number of available interviewees but also limits the diversity of perspectives on Vision Zero's early development. However, the majority of key individuals involved in Vision Zero's early development were identified and interviewed, and the lack of representation from the Swedish Road Administration's top management at the time has not been considered critical to developing a better understanding of how contextually embedded individuals are becoming inspired by an institutional entrepreneur to follow a radical proposal for institutional change.

In line with this study's abductive approach, the identified pattern in the collected data was contrasted with the value-belief-norm theory to analyse interviewees' voiced motivation for how and why they chose to engage in efforts related to Vision Zero. Before the results are presented, however, the empirical context is outlined as an overlapping case narrative.

3. Empirical context

Vision Zero envisions zero fatalities as the ultimate goal of traffic safety and emphasises that 'life and health can never be exchanged for other benefits within society' (Tingvall & Haworth, 1999, p. 1). This is a reasonable expectation today, but when the Vision Zero Road Safety Policy was introduced in Sweden in 1997, it fundamentally redefined the national traffic safety sector (Elvebakk, 2007). It was a radical policy innovation (Belin et al., 2012) that challenged both the predominant approach to road safety, in which individual road users were seen as solely responsible for crashes, and the notion of a cost-benefit ratio, in which a monetary value for life and health determined how much money should be spent on decreasing the risk of accidents. Vision Zero was thus only possible to adopt after drastic changes in the dominant road safety institutions at the time, with regard to road-safety problem formulation and views on responsibilities and attitudes to and among road users (Belin et al., 2012; Rosencrantz et al., 2007).

The central idea of Vision Zero is that everyone involved in developing the transport system, from auto engineers and road planners to policymakers, shares a responsibility to design the road system in a way that prevents severe or fatal outcomes due to human error (Johansson, 2009; Larsson et al., 2010). Road safety should thus be considered from a systems perspective. Vehicles, infrastructure, and road use shall be designed in relation to the human body's tolerance for kinetic energy (Tingvall, 1997). A professional transportation system designer cannot trade off individual lives for the benefit of society and its citizens. Thus, Vision Zero is a system approach to road safety in which the road system is designed for reduced speed and increased safety. For example, by introducing roundabouts instead of intersections with traffic lights, speed and the risk of fatal injuries to car occupants is reduced by more than 90 %. By limiting the speed in cities to 30 km/h (18.6 mph), mixing cars and cyclists and removing crosswalks to let pedestrians cross the street anywhere they want, there are fewer accidents that cause severe injuries or fatalities (data from the interview with the Director of traffic safety, 19 May 2021).

3.1. A radical policy innovation was born

The idea behind Vision Zero was proposed by the director of traffic safety at the Swedish Road Administration (today called the Swedish Transport Administration) during an annual meeting between Swedish Road Administration management and the Minister of Communications. The director of traffic safety is widely recognised in documents and by interviewees as the ideator and key individual behind Vision Zero (i.e., the institutional entrepreneur).

'As the director of traffic safety, I was asked by the minister about the long-term target for reducing fatalities in the traffic system. And without having anchored my thoughts in the Road Administration, I answered "Zero!" I can still remember the reaction in the room – dead silence. I had said something that completely went against the culture of the Road Administration. Zero was challenging not only Sweden's transportation policies but any transportation policy expressed by any road administration or parliament anywhere in the world […] Zero would mean that safety would trump all other factors for building up transport policies

and priorities. This went completely against the prevailing paradigm – "It's your career, not mine", said the director general after the meeting. But the minister found it attractive', says the director of traffic safety during the interview.

'I thought "zero" was an interesting answer', says the Minister of Communication at the time, during the interview. And she continues: '[…] you can't really accept anything else. The idea of zero also fitted well into my long-term political ambition. Traffic safety was one of three political focal areas for me'.

The director of traffic safety and his closest road safety expert colleagues started to develop a set of recommendations for road safety targeted to road providers instead of road users, including ethical standpoints (Vägverket, 1996), a new science-based approach to road safety efforts (Tingvall, 1997) and theoretical models (e.g., Boström et al., 1997). 'The Minister of Communication paid special interest to these proposals and commissioned the Swedish Road Administration to conduct several inquiries on various aspects of road safety', says the political expert adviser who worked for the minister at the time.

'Thanks to the minister's support, the director general supported us in developing our concept. He was not really in favour of all our ideas, but I think he was proud to have a team that was trying to be at the forefront […] Successively, the support for the ideas started to grow, but so did the resistance', says the director of traffic safety.

In hindsight, scholars view the Vision Zero Policy as a radical policy shift (e.g., Andersson & Pettersson, 2008; Belin et al., 2012; McAndrews, 2013). Calling Vision Zero 'radical' is, however, most likely no exaggeration. The Minister of Communication, for example, referred to Vision Zero as 'a total change in approach' (von Holst et al., 2013, p. VI, own translation). Close colleagues of the director of traffic safety, who took part in developing recommendations, ethical standpoints and new science-based methods for road safety, also remember 'zero' as a rather radical approach. 'The first time the director of traffic safety said "zero" to me, I smiled and thought to myself, "Sure, that sounds good, but it is not possible". But the system perspective that was brought [into traffic safety] really did pave the way for me, and it also made it possible for others to join in', says the expert and researcher in road safety (B).

There were strong protests when the vision of zero road traffic fatalities was brought to life. Common objections were 'This is a utopia', 'It is not realistic' and 'This cannot be accomplished' (von Holst et al., 2013). 'The first time I read about [Vision Zero], I remember thinking "This is a stupid idea. We'll never reach zero"', says planner (A), and continues, 'but if you work in a political organisation, you have to adapt, and I'm good at that. I'm an engineer by training, and it is up to us to translate political decisions into practice – into something everyone can understand.'

Today, Vision Zero is still the prevailing road safety policy in Sweden. During the first half of 2000, Vision Zero garnered more attention and was brought forward as the start of a new road safety paradigm (WHO, 2004). Influential European traffic agencies started to argue that Vision Zero should become an official EU policy (Elvebakk, 2007). Vision Zero is widely recognised internationally and is the departure for many road safety policies worldwide (Clarke, 2008; Corben et al., 2022; Mendoza et al., 2017; Safarpour et al., 2020). It is also a model implemented in other safety-related areas, such as fire safety, patient safety, workplace safety and suicide prevention (Kristianssen et al., 2018).

'Nowadays, the transition to Vision Zero is often talked about as an easy process, but there were many conflicts and barriers along the way. Many were very sceptical of Vision Zero. Especially the implementation of 2 + 1 roads [i.e., using two road lanes in one direction and one lane in the opposite direction, with the two-lane section alternating between directions every few kilometres]. I would say that initially, nearly everyone, including all emergency services personnel, was against this idea. However, an ambition of zero fatalities was difficult to argue against. And as it turned out, the 2 + 1 road was an absolutely fantastic innovation. It works much better than we had anticipated. So, by the end of 2010, Sweden had more than 3.000 km of 2 + 1 roads. And the emergency services personnel became highly engaged advocates in this […] After all, I think the biggest resistance came from within our organisation. There was an unwillingness to change priorities and do things in new ways. But after a while, it became difficult to ignore the results', says the expert and researcher in road safety (A).

4. Results and analysis

The results reveal various key psychological factors for contextually embedded individuals to become engaged in efforts related to Vision Zero. Grouped into 1st-order concepts, these have been categorised into similar patterns and further grouped into second-order themes and aggregated dimensions (see Table 2). Subsequently, second-order themes and aggregated dimensions are further explained and exemplified with quotations from the interviews.

4.1. *Activation – this is good!*

Recognising the importance of activating personal values, the results show that when the interviewees were exposed to the institutional entrepreneur and his ideas, many perceived Vision Zero as an attractive alternative to the prevailing road safety norms and practices, despite its radical approach. 'Vision Zero presented a shift in ethical perspective, from emphasising the consequences of actions to emphasising the value of human life […] It was very different from the current notion and practice in how the road transport system was planned at the time', says strategist (B). The institutional entrepreneur was (more or less intentionally) skilled at framing Vision Zero so that it appealed to individuals with different value ideals. In other words, for various reasons, contextually embedded individuals were thinking 'This is good!' (see Table 3).

4.1.1. *Exo-personal cues*

Interviewees referred to different sources (i.e., cues) as important for their discovery of Vision Zero. For example, some referred to *easy-to-understand recommendations about possible actions*, such as in På väg mot det trafiksäkra samhället (Regeringen, 1997), 11 punkter för ökad trafiksäkerhet (Regeringskansliet, 1999) and Nollvisionen–En idé om ett vägtransportsystem utan hälsoförluster (Vägverket, 1996). Others referred to the importance of *science-based decision-making*, drawing on emerging studies of car accidents or early interventions, such as the 2 + 1 road north of Gävle. '[…] the results were just astonishing', says the project manager. Others brought forward *publicity in media,* or that Vision Zero represented *ethical standpoints that resonate with personal values*. Some interviewees were attracted by the *new approach to road safety* and the *emphasis on collaboration*. For example, 'I was attracted by the systematic approach to road safety. It emphasises the importance of collaboration between various actors and grounding interventions in science', says the expert and researcher in road safety (B).

These cues appear to have activated two different value dimensions in relation to Vision Zero: pro-social values and self-oriented values. These value dimensions echo Schwartz's dynamics underlying his value structure, specifically the value scale of socially relating to and impacting others, versus fulfilling personal interests and characteristics (Schwartz, 2012). In this sense, Vision Zero represented *attractive futures* that different stakeholders could relate to, either through collective responsibility or through alignment with their own values and goals.

4.1.2. *Pro-social values*

In the pro-social value dimension, individuals underscore the importance of community and societal well-being, advocating for social responsibility and prioritising collective welfare. Individuals basing their actions on pro-social values act in their professional role in ways that benefit society as a whole, promoting policies and practices that ensure the long-term sustainability and health of the community. It is a systemic, community-oriented approach that endorses the

Table 3
Data supporting interpretations of how contextually embedded individuals are becoming convinced by an institutional entrepreneur.

Theme	Representative quotations or exemplifications
Activation – this is good!	
Exo-personal cues	'Vision Zero is both a goal and an approach. I think of it as the latter. It's hard to criticise, it is more of a feeling' (Expert). 'I was attracted by the systematic approach to road safety. It emphasises the importance of collaboration between various actors and grounding interventions in science' (Expert and researcher in road safety (B)). 'There was this study on speed and injuries, and when I saw the data, I remember thinking, "This is the way!" Today, it is mainstream, but at the time, it was quite radical!' (Planner B). 'There was a test conducted on a 2 + 1 road north of Gävle, and it received a lot of criticism from all sides. But the results were just astonishing' (Project manager).
Pro-social values	'I think everyone has some type of responsibility to the social contract, and for me, professionally, that relates to traffic safety' (Director of traffic safety). 'There was something attractive in the system perspective on traffic safety. And I still think so. It's a safety perspective that involves the social contract. I think that's important' (Expert). 'Well-planned transport infrastructures can help bridge socio-economic differences and provide safe and equal access to mobility for all residents' (Strategist (A)). 'I have a strong commitment to enhancing traffic safety, and I believe that only the collaborative efforts you can get from a policy intervention can lead to substantial changes in our society' (Expert and researcher in road safety (A)). 'The focus on human lives in Vision Zero was important to me. Traffic safety is a collective responsibility shared by all members of society. I think we can create safer roads and communities for everyone, especially if we work together' (Planner B). 'I remember that the director of traffic safety said "zero" […] He made a comparison with workplace safety in the construction sector, and I had previously been engaged in union work in that sector, so I could very much relate to the zero ambition. One cannot refuse to support Vision Zero. It becomes morally wrong' (Minister of Communication).
Self-oriented values	'I like being at the centre of innovation and development. I think I'm a very curious person' (Expert in vehicles, machines and fuels). 'The tradition was that traffic safety and accessibility should be based on a socio-economic calculation. But these people began discussing evidence-based decision-making, which, of course, I think is much better. Not only for making sure that you deliver what you are supposed to deliver, which, in my case, was traffic safety and accessibility' (Project manager). 'What was most appealing to me about Vision Zero was that it paved the way for a new way of thinking about measures' (Political expert advisor).
Anchoring – is this right?	
Exo-personal sources of anchoring beliefs	'An 11-point program was launched in the spring of 1999. The first point was the importance of investing in dangerous roads' (Expert and researcher in road safety (A)). 'I was very much strengthened by the attention our publications got from other traffic safety scholars. The voiced support from the minister and the director general was also a support to our endeavour' (Expert and researcher in road safety (B)), 'When the first 2 + 1 road was set up, I was quite nervous. But it hadn't been more than a week before a woman contacted us to thank us for having saved her life. She was on her way to the vet with a sick dog in the backseat and had glanced at the dog and crashed into the central barrier with oncoming traffic. Here, we would have had another serious accident if we hadn't had the central barrier. This experience strengthened my conviction that we must be persistent, and we must try' (Regional manager). 'There was a test conducted on a 2 + 1 road north of Gävle, and it received a lot of criticism from all sides. But the results were just astonishing.' 'There were also writings in our policy documents about the importance of road safety. Although, it was not mentioned how we should work with it […] But ideas can always be bounced off colleagues' (Planner A).
Personal beliefs	'If someone is driving legally, they should not risk dying or being seriously injured because of simple mistakes' (Minister of Communication). 'We really need to see a reduction in traffic-related fatalities and serious injuries. But this is only possible by influencing policy, vehicles and infrastructural advancements and fostering a safety culture among road users' (Expert and researcher in road safety (B). 'When the results are so clear, it is a misconduct if one does not act on them. As a researcher, I believe we are responsible for communicating findings and ensuring they are applied' Expert and researcher in road safety (C)). 'I think everyone within the transport system has a responsibility to reduce or remove risks for the users' (Planner B). '[Vision Zero] allows you to provide so much more safety for the money' (Political expert advisor).
Selfless beliefs	'Traffic safety isn't just about money or ensuring there are motorways across the country. It is a fundamental moral obligation to preserve human life' (Regional manager).
Extended role responsibility	'We really need to see a reduction in traffic-related fatalities and serious injuries. But this is only possible by influencing policy, vehicles and infrastructural advancements and fostering a safety culture among road users' (Expert and researcher in road safety (B)).
Role fulfilment	'It was when I saw the first results from the in-depth systems studies of all fatal crashes in Sweden that it became clear to me that a single mistake could lead to a total disaster' (Expert and researcher in road safety (A)). 'The zero approach is hard to criticise. It's the only right thing to guide your work if you are in the safety business' (Strategist (A)).
Achievement	'The attention we received in the media, and the acceptance from various actors, really strengthened us and it made it difficult for the sceptics at the Road Administration to oppose us' (Expert and researcher in road safety (C)). 'Regarding [Vision Zero], there probably aren't really such big obstacles – it's probably oneself who creates them. But positive feedback from colleagues is, of course, important' (Strategist (B)).
Personal norms	'[Vision Zero] is hard to criticise, it is more of a feeling' (Expert). 'Our job is to foster social equity and justice' (Strategist (A)). 'I see no reason why one should not work for better road safety' (Minister of Communication). 'The results spoke for themselves. It was obvious that the models we had developed provided scientific evidence of the human body's biomechanical tolerances to kinetic energy' (Expert and researcher in road safety (C)). 'I worked with [a major car manufacturer], and they also had a strategy focused on safety. We found common ground, which strengthened my belief that we at [The Swedish Road Association] were on the right track' (Expert in vehicles, machines and fuels). 'Building motorways is associated with enormous costs. And as a government agency, one should be careful to get the most out of the taxpayers' money. So, when the 11-point program was launched in 1999,

(*continued on next page*)

Table 3 (*continued*)

Theme	Representative quotations or exemplifications
	I pushed through a change in the allocation of some of the maintenance funds to the regions, which included a requirement for 2 + 1 solutions, or they had to find money elsewhere' (Project manager). 'The norm, though, was to build motorways, but in my opinion, the costs were not justifiable when it became clear how good and inexpensive it was to build 2 + 1 roads instead' (Strategist A).
New value-driven workplace behaviour	Introducing a system perspective to goals for policy and societal development (Expert). Introducing a reform to direct investments towards 2 + 1 roads (Expert and researcher in road safety (A). Developing a theoretical model for the human body's biomechanical tolerances to kinetic energy, summoning actors to present results and initiating discussions about traffic norms and safety culture (Expert and researcher in road safety (B)). In-depth systems studies of all fatal crashes in Sweden to make safety comparisons between new and old vehicles and tests of road designs and barriers and publishing results from the Euro NCAP (Expert and researcher in road safety (C)). Developing a radical car safety innovation (Expert in vehicles, machines and fuels). Meeting opinion leaders and local politicians to discuss road safety and local needs (Minister of Communication) Introducing the 2 + 1 road design (Planner (A)). Designing roundabout intersections instead of traffic light-controlled intersections and applying a maximum speed limit of 30 km/h in areas where cars and unprotected road users would be mixed (Planner (B)). Developing the notion that mobility is a function of safety (Political expert advisor). Changing policy for maintenance funds (Project manager). Implementing the 2 + 1 road design (Regional manager). Summoning stakeholders to present a new system approach to road safety (Strategist (A)). Utilising new approaches to trigger actions among stakeholders (Strategist (B)).

interdependence of individuals within societal structures and stresses that *well-being* will always be the most important value in society. Planner (B) gives an excellent example of the pro-social value dimension: 'The focus on human lives in Vision Zero was important to me. Traffic safety is a collective responsibility shared by all members of society. I think we can create safer roads and communities for everyone, especially if we work together', also highlighting that *ensuring traffic safety* is a shared responsibility and accomplishment.

Pro-social values encompass well-being beyond oneself and the broader goal of creating a society that cares for the welfare of all its members. For example, strategist (A) says: 'Well-planned mobility infrastructures can help *bridge socio-economic differences* and provide safe and equal access to mobility for all residents, irrespective of their background'.

Furthermore, the pro-social value dimension also includes the moral *responsibility for other persons' lives*. This is, for example, expressed by the expert and researcher in road safety (A), who says: 'I have a strong commitment to enhancing traffic safety, and I believe that only the collaborative efforts that you can get from a policy intervention can lead to substantial changes in our society'. Also, the director of traffic safety voiced the importance of social responsibilities: 'I think everyone has some type of responsibility to the social contract, and for me, professionally, that relates to traffic safety'.

Another example is the Minister of Communication, who, during her term of office, used different ways to legitimise Vision Zero (see Tingvall et al., 2020; von Holst et al., 2013). 'I remember that the director of traffic safety said "zero" […] 'He made a comparison with workplace safety in the construction sector, and I had previously been engaged in union work in that sector, so I could very much relate to the zero ambition. One cannot refuse to support Vision Zero. It becomes morally wrong'. The regional manager is also reasoning along the same lines when he says: 'Traffic safety isn't just about money or making sure there are motorways across the country. It is a fundamental moral obligation to preserve human life'. Hence, both the minister and the regional manager voice personal beliefs about an extended responsibility for others and the importance of *improving road safety* for all roads.

4.1.3. Self-oriented values

The self-oriented value dimension underscores the significance of relative success and aspirations, advocating for self-empowerment and personal fulfilment. Individuals basing their actions on self-oriented values take opportunities to act in their professional role in ways that benefit personal interests, such as power and recognition. For example, by engaging in activities to *satisfy one's own interests*. Self-oriented values thus encompass positive self-attribution and self-esteem. The expert in vehicles, machines and fuels exemplifies this: 'When we started this work, it was important to involve other actors in the traffic system. That gave me an opportunity to work closely with [a major car manufacturer]. They were already strong in safety thinking, but they also needed a traffic system perspective […] We developed many new solutions during those years – some of which I am still very proud of […] I like being at the centre of innovation and development. I think I'm a very curious person.'

Self-oriented reasons for *feeling confident* in decision-making and *being recognised* in the professional role were also voiced by the project manager, who stresses the importance of evidence-based decision-making as a means for securing quality in deliverables: 'The tradition was that traffic safety and accessibility should be based on a socio-economic calculation. But these people began discussing evidence-based decision-making, which, of course, I think is much better. Not only for making sure that you deliver what you are supposed to deliver, which, in my case, was traffic safety and accessibility'. In essence, self-oriented values thus motivated individuals to engage in Vision Zero to realise their own interests.

4.2. Anchoring – is this right?

Even though Vision Zero appeared as an attractive alternative offering opportunities for engaging in new workplace behaviours, many interviewees expressed a need to ensure that a new workplace behaviour would be socially acceptable in their professional role (i.e., finding out 'Is this right?'). This 'anchoring' was done differently by different people, for example, by bouncing ideas off colleagues during a coffee break (planner A), reading the organisation's strategy documents (project manager), or relying on societal discourses to find out what is (morally) right to do (planner B). The expert and researcher in road safety (B) anchored her early-stage support for Vision Zero in the attention her publications got from other traffic safety scholars and the voiced support they received from the minister and the director general. The expert in vehicles, machines and fuels, instead, anchored his new workplace behaviour in external collaboration: 'I worked with [a major car manufacturer], and they also had a strategy focused on safety. We found common ground, which strengthened my belief that we at [The Swedish Road Association] were on the right track' (for additional examples see Table 3).

Anchoring beliefs about new value-driven behaviour implies both a practical and a cognitive process of gathering information that can morally and socially justify, or acknowledge, that one's contribution will be accepted and useful in a specific context. (J. I. De Groot & Steg, 2009; Stern, 2000). Ultimately, anchoring beliefs about new value-driven behaviour at the workplace is only required if an individual needs to justify taking ownership of their workplace behaviour. For example, the

director of traffic safety presented his idea about Vision Zero to the minister without anchoring.

It is important to note that not all new workplace behaviour is value-driven and needs to be morally or socially justified. For example, the introduction of new regulations or the implementation of new technologies may also drive the development of new workplace behaviour in groups of employees. However, this is beyond the scope of this article.

4.2.1. Exo-personal sources of anchoring beliefs

Many of the interviewees anchored beliefs about new workplace behaviour in exo-personal sources. i.e., sources external to the person's own thoughts and beliefs. In total, four different sources of anchoring were identified (see Table 2).

The first two sources of anchoring identified in this study are *written strategies and documents,* and *management and leaders' support.* They align with the contextual factors suggested by Stern (2000) as important for influencing environmentally significant behaviour. The written strategies and documents that the interviewees identified explicitly as important sources in their decision to engage in the early stages of Vision Zero included recommendations, ethical standpoints and new science-based road safety models. Also, easy-to-understand guides to interventions that could improve traffic safety supported an increasing collective action among diverse stakeholders.

Voiced support for the vision from managers and leaders (including politicians) and statements, such as, 'We must also to a greater extent call for responsibility both from those who design the road transport system and those who use it' (Tingvall, 1997, p. vii), allowed everyone in the traffic system to explore ways of making contributions to the vision, even if these contributions were in conflict with the prevailing road safety notion.

The second two sources of anchoring identified in this study, *colleagues* and sources *external to the organisations,* are not sufficiently brought up by Stern (2000). For altering value-driven behaviour among individuals within an organisational field, the results in this study show that anchoring beliefs with colleagues appeared to be common and important. 'Ideas can always be bounced off colleagues', says, for example, planner (A). Sometimes, reading about what others had done and achieved in line with Vision Zero worked as both a cue and an anchor for new workplace behaviour: 'There was a test conducted on a 2 + 1 road north of Gävle, and it received a lot of criticism from all sides. But the results were just astonishing', says the project manager who introduced a new policy stating that in order to receive maintenance funds, it was mandatory to investigate the possibility of converting the road into a 2 + 1 road.

Anchoring outside the organisation was typically related to societal discourses in other areas (such as in health care and the construction sector, which was voiced by the Minister of Communication), general beliefs about a profession: 'Road providers are expected to provide safe road infrastructures' (Expert and researcher in road safety (C)), or voiced support for Vision Zero by other actors, such as the police and media. 'After a while, it became difficult [also for emergency services personnel] to ignore the results', says the expert and researcher in road safety (A).

4.2.2. Personal beliefs

Interviewees voiced four different concepts of personal beliefs related to engaging in Vision Zero (Table 2). For example, the key shift in integrating safety as a fundamental aspect of mobility brought forward *selfless beliefs* such as that every road should be safe, not only the busiest ones, and that well-being will always be the most important value in society. 'Traffic safety isn't just about money or ensuring there are motorways across the country. It is a fundamental moral obligation to preserve human life' says the regional manager.

The introduction of scientific and data-driven approaches, such as the creation of the theoretical model to analyse the kinetic energy experienced by the human body in traffic situations and conducting in-depth studies of fatal crashes in Sweden to compare the safety performance of new and old vehicles, was central to those who voiced an *extended role responsibility*. The moral obligation to preserve human life brings an extended responsibility beyond what is expected in the professional role. 'We really need to see a reduction in traffic-related fatalities and serious injuries. But this is only possible by influencing policy, vehicles and infrastructural advancements and fostering a safety culture among road users', says, for example, the expert and researcher in road safety (B), highlighting the importance of a system perspective and selfless collaboration among different actors.

This evidence-based approach further reinforced some individuals' beliefs about *role fulfilment,* such as the importance of professionalism and doing a good job. 'It was when I saw the first results from the in-depth systems studies of all fatal crashes in Sweden that it became clear to me that a single mistake could lead to a total disaster', says the expert and researcher in road safety (A).

Individuals emphasising the importance of *achievement* expressed their personal beliefs about recognition and achieving personal goals. For example, the expert and researcher in road safety (C) talked about being part of the early publishing of Euro NCAP results, contributing to transparency and shared knowledge within the field. The expert in vehicles, machines and fuels, instead, talked about being at the centre of a radical change process as a professional achievement.

4.2.3. Personal norms

Recognising the importance of our inner moral compass and self-concept, also at the workplace, a person who has salient or activated personal values (i.e., feeling that 'this is good') and who believes that his or her actions can contribute to the process of institutional change, may still need to anchor new workplace behaviour in external expectations of their professional role. Finding out what 'is right' may thus also include an aspect of calibrating a new workplace behaviour to the inner compass. 'Our job is to foster social equity and justice', says strategist (A), indicating that there are *self-imposed moral duties*. Strategist (A) and the project manager, instead, bring forward *role-based duties* related to not wasting public funds: 'The norm, though, was to build motorways, but in my opinion, the costs were not justifiable when it became clear how good and inexpensive it was to build 2 + 1 roads instead', says strategist (A). Others emphasised the importance of *what others are doing* and what they *perceive as acceptable or expected* within their professional role. For example, the expert in vehicles, machines and fuels was strengthened in his belief about being on the right track in his collaboration with the car manufacturer. Hence, engaging in new value-driven workplace behaviour may need both relevance and moral anchoring.

4.2.4. New value-driven workplace behaviour

Vision Zero states that there should be no trade-off between safety and mobility. 'Mobility is a function of safety, not vice versa, and the safer the road infrastructure, the greater the mobility' was the main communication in the first publication about Vision Zero (Vägverket, 1996). When introduced, the way Vision Zero was communicated thus opened up new ways to motivate decisions and engage in new practices. In other words, it allowed for a *cognitive reframing* of the trade-off between safety and mobility.

One of the early new value-driven workplace behaviours that emerged after the introduction of Vision Zero was an initiative to learn how to minimise the impact of human error within the existing road policy. A team of road safety experts at the Swedish Road Administration develop system models for road traffic safety based on scientific evidence of the human body's biomechanical tolerances to kinetic energy (e.g., Boström et al., 1997; Krafft et al., 1996; Tingvall et al., 2000). This became the start of a new *practice development*. 'We started to do in-depth systems studies of all fatal crashes in Sweden, we made safety comparisons between new and old vehicles and tests of road designs and barriers, […] We also started to publish results from the Euro NCAP [European New Car Assessment Programme]', says the expert and

researcher in road safety (C). Today, Euro NCAP still advocates higher safety performance for vehicles sold in the European market (van Ratingen et al., 2016).

'Once we started to publish our results, our ideas attracted attention among traffic safety scholars, and this gave us confidence. With support from the minister and our new director general, we started to summon actors, such as the police, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, the National Society for Road Safety and Swedish car producers, to present our results and initiate discussions about traffic norms and safety culture […] We also invited media to these events. The director of traffic safety was really good at involving the media', says the expert and researcher in road safety (B), exemplifying a *collaborative engagement* among actors who started to meet in new forums for road safety dialogues.

Inviting the media to communicate Vision Zero was a strategic approach of *sensemaking* by the director of traffic safety. 'Our approach was to highlight what we as a society can do to prevent accidents', says the director of traffic safety. To further inspire others and make it easy to engage and guide the development of interventions that could improve traffic safety, Vision Zero was formulated into an easy-to-understand bullet list of possible actions for improved road safety. Initially, the list was developed for daily road safety efforts (e.g., in Vägverket, 1996), however, the political expert advisor saw a larger potential and engaged in creating similar lists for politicians (e.g., in Regeringen, 1997; Regeringskansliet, 1999).

The visibility in media, the attention shown by an emerging number of actors and the guide to improved road safety activated many to start experimenting with new solutions, such as roundabouts instead of intersections with traffic lights (Planner B), implementing the 2 + 1 road design (Regional manager) and radical car safety innovation (Expert in vehicle, machines and fuels). Interestingly, Vision Zero not only inspired the development of technical innovation, but also inspired individuals to change workplace behaviour and trigger actions among stakeholders (Strategist (B)), changing policy for maintenance funds (Project manager) and reducing speed limits when planning for car traffic in cities (Planner B). 'During the first years, there was a growing pride among us colleagues at the Swedish Road Administration. We were proud of being part of something that attracted attention. Also, the ones who had been criticising us pivoted and became part of promoting this new perspective. And after a while, it was just growing by itself. A lot of people within the Swedish Road Administration became very good at road safety', says the strategist (A), highlighting a growing *strategic and political alignment*.

5. Discussion

This article offers a novel perspective on institutional entrepreneurship by theorising how contextually embedded individuals become inspired by an institutional entrepreneur to embrace a radical proposal for institutional change. Drawing on theories from social psychology and results from the early stages of Vision Zero, the article proposes an expanded VBN theory that links personal values, categorised as pro-social and self-oriented, to value-driven behaviour in the enactment of institutional change (see Fig. 1). Hence, the article breaks with the view on actors as prominently embedded within a field and contributes to the literature on how institutional entrepreneurship develops into collective efforts and diffuses throughout an organisational field (Lawrence et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Rao et al., 2003). By adding activation of personal values and anchoring beliefs as key conditions for new value-driven workplace behaviour, the article not only contributes to the social psychology literature, specifically the VBN theory (Stern et al., 1999), but also to a better understanding of what motivates individuals to endorse visions of imagined futures and choose to take part in new value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change, despite their contextual embeddedness (Battilana et al., 2009; Dorado, 2005).

The results in this article suggest that if personal values are activated, for example, by the inspiration of an institutional entrepreneur, and new value-driven behaviour can be anchored in exo-personal sources, individuals within an organisational field will be more inclined to alter their value-driven behaviour and opt to enact institutional change. In Vision Zero, individuals' engagement in new value-driven workplace behaviour originated in pro-social and self-oriented personal values. Interestingly, for engaging in value-driven behaviour related to the adoption of novel practices and technologies, self-oriented values do not appear to be negatively correlated in similar ways as they typically are with environmentally significant behaviour (J. I. M. De Groot & Steg, 2008; Gifford & Nilsson, 2014; Stern, 2000; Stern et al., 1999).

Vision Zero illustrates a journey in which an increasing number of contextually embedded individuals became inspired by an institutional entrepreneur to engage in efforts to develop and implement a radical shift in traffic safety policy and practice. It is a journey of evolving enactment of institutional change that started with an ideator, i.e., an institutional entrepreneur, and the involvement of an increasing number of individuals operating as early adopters or change agents. Together they enabled a progressive policy shift that was only possible after drastic changes to the prevailing road-safety-problem formulation, views on responsibilities and attitudes towards and between road users (Belin et al., 2012; Rosencrantz et al., 2007).

The journey of Vision Zero took place within a highly institutionalised field. When first introduced, Vision Zero represented a radical shift in the ethical perspective on road safety, challenging the prevailing paradigm. By adopting a systems perspective on traffic safety, rather than focusing solely on road users' actions, safety would trump all other factors in shaping transportation policies and priorities (Belin et al., 2012). The early adopters, who enlisted support for the institutional entrepreneur's vision and took new actions to bring about institutional change, initially met strong resistance in sparking cooperation towards collective ends. Despite this, they found motivation to engage in new workplace behaviour and to encourage additional people from diverse groups with divergent interests to enlist support and work towards Vision Zero. As more and more individuals got involved, the enactment of institutional change diffused throughout the organisational field as institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This, in turn, eventually brought about radical changes in the prevailing notion of road safety. Vision Zero thus evolved from a policy innovation into a new road safety notion as an increasing number of individuals chose to participate in the emerging process of institutional change.

Similar results have been previously brought forward in small, niche-like contexts (e.g., Dorado, 2013; Maguire et al., 2004). The results in this study, however, show that even in highly institutionalised fields, individuals can be inspired by an institutional entrepreneur and, at their own discretion, engage in value-driven workplace behaviour to enact institutional change. Furthermore, this study reveals that individuals are more inclined to endorse an institutional entrepreneur's vision of imagined futures when their personal values have been activated and when they have been able to anchor their beliefs about their new workplace in exo-personal sources. In other words, individuals who commit to new value-driven workplace behaviour and enact institutional change do so because they find it desirable, or morally important, and possible.

In the case of Vision Zero, individuals' engagement was driven by pro-social or self-oriented personal values and beliefs about new workplace behaviour, which was anchored in written strategies, management support, colleagues or sources external to the organisation. It is shown that when the institutional entrepreneur and his early adopters used the legitimacy associated with their social position to produce, for example, recommendations and science-based theoretical models for road safety, the primary function of these products was not to inspire colleagues and others to engage in Vision Zero (c.f., Colombero et al., 2021; Dorado, 2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Hemingway, 2005). Instead, colleagues and others primarily used these products to anchor their decision to adopt and engage in Vision Zero. One of the key takeaways from this

case study is, thus, that enacting institutional change involves establishing effective cues for activating different types of personal values, as well as structures for anchoring beliefs about new value-driven workplace behaviour.

This new insight holds relevance for both managerial implications in internal organisational transformations and the endeavours of numerous contemporary sustainability missions. The results underscore the significance of enabling cues for activating personal values and structures in which employees can find support for adopting new workplace behaviour and embracing novel technologies to achieve attractive futures. Employees acting at their own discretion can, in turn, inspire colleagues and credible others to embrace radical and transformative changes. Both cues to activate personal values and structures to anchor beliefs about new behaviour are key in facilitating participation in institutional change.

Many years have passed since the introduction of Vision Zero. Time has reduced the pool of interviewees, the diversity of perspectives and increased the risk of recall biases and errors. However, being closer in time to the event provides less insight into long-term effects and scenarios of possible futures. There is thus a problematic paradox between time and studying individual-level motivational factors of successful transformative processes. Still, personal values are known to be stable over time (J. I. M. De Groot & Steg, 2008; Schwartz, 2012; Stern et al., 1999), and memories of what was considered important (i.e., related to personal values) are likely more reliable than memories of what was once achieved.

The main limitation of this study, however, is that the case is set in a singular national setting. Individuals' possibilities of taking professional action at their own discretion may vary between different national and industry cultures. Thus, future studies are encouraged to use cases from different national and organisational fields and with a larger number of interviewees to deepen the understanding of how an institutional entrepreneur can convince contextually embedded individuals to follow a radical proposal for institutional change.

Over the years, an increasing number of people in the Swedish Road Administration became engaged in efforts to realise Vision Zero. In this process of accumulating collective action, an increasing number of individuals became exposed to cues that activate various types of personal values. In addition, an increasing number of documents, initiatives, engaged colleagues and credible others also provided anchoring possibilities for those who choose to engage in realising Vision Zero. Activation of personal values and anchoring of new workplace behaviour where thus made increasingly available, and engagement in Vision Zero was, eventually, no longer divergent. What was once radical had become the new normal.

6. Conclusions and implications

This article proposes that activation of personal values and anchoring beliefs about new value-driven workplace behaviour are key conditions that explain how contextually embedded individuals become engaged in change and adoption of novel practices and technologies. By examining the early phases of Vision Zero, a road safety policy in Sweden, this article offers an individual-level perspective to address a gap in the literature regarding the motivational factors for individuals to endorse institutional entrepreneurs' ideas and engage in new value-driven behaviour to enact institutional change.

Vision Zero was selected as a case because it represents a radical and transformative change process that has significantly impacted the Swedish traffic system. The case is particularly interesting because it illustrates the development of a progressive, long-term vision based on ambitious principles rather than strict regulations. Consequently, it shares many similarities with contemporary sustainability missions, which can only be achieved through collective efforts.

The results demonstrate that individuals who are contextually embedded can choose to engage in efforts of institutional change when they perceive an opportunity that aligns with their personal values. In the case of Vision Zero, these values are pro-social and self-oriented personal values. Thus, while a vision of achieving zero traffic fatalities is difficult to oppose, Vision Zero did not exclusively motivate participation in institutional change due to its inherent moral reasons. However, before embarking on new value-driven workplace behaviour, individuals anchored their beliefs about new behaviour in various structures, such as strategies, documents, management, societal discourses, colleagues or external actors. Hence, this article demonstrates that cues for activating personal values and structures for anchoring beliefs about new workplace behaviour are key factors in accumulating and converging contextually embedded individuals to become involved in institutional change.

The results in this article offer insights to both institutional entrepreneurs and management seeking to garner support among diverse stakeholders. The article reveals a missing link in a causal chain of institutional change within public organisations. By exploring methods to activate various types of personal values and providing structures for anchoring beliefs about new workplace behaviour, efforts to break with existing expectations, norms and regulations can be accelerated.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Niklas Fernqvist: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: Niklas Fernqvist reports financial support was provided by Swedish Transport Administration.

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Appendix 1. Interview guide

After a brief introduction about the research project and myself, the following questions guided the conversation in a semi-structured manner:

- Tell me about yourself and your role at [the organisation].
- Do you remember the first time you encountered Vision Zero?
  - o What were your initial thoughts when you first heard about Vision Zero?
  - o How did your closest colleagues react?
  - o Did your and your colleagues' attitudes toward Vision Zero change over time?

- In what ways was Vision Zero communicated?
  - What analogies, examples, or arguments were used?
- Did these ideas influence your work?
  - Why did you choose to engage with Vision Zero?
  - When did you start doing things differently?
- What enabled you to engage with Vision Zero?
- How did more people come to support Vision Zero?
- Did you actively try to involve or convince others?
  - Who were the first to be convinced?
  - Were some individuals particularly difficult to persuade?
  - How did you communicate Vision Zero?
- What do you think was the key factor that led individuals in your organisation and beyond to rethink road safety?
- Do you know who was involved in developing the ideas behind Vision Zero?
- Who else would you recommend I speak with about the early phases of Vision Zero?

Table A.1
Documents consulted regarding the early phases of Vision Zero

Document type	
Academic literature	
	Andersson and Pettersson (2008), The Vision Thing.
	Belin (2021), The Swedish Vision Zero – An Advanced Safety Culture Phenomenon.
	Belin and Tillgren (2013), Vision Zero. How a policy innovation is dashed by interest conflicts but may prevail in the end.
	Belin et al. (1997), Vision Zero and its consequences.
	Belin et al. (2012), Vision Zero–a road safety policy innovation.
	Elvebakk (2007), Vision zero: remaking road safety.
	Hysing (2021), Responsibilization: The case of road safety governance.
	Hysing (2022), Designing collaborative governance that is fit for purpose: Theorising policy support and voluntary action for road safety in Sweden.
	Johansson (2009), Vision Zero–Implementing a policy for traffic safety.
	Kristianssen et al. (2018), Swedish Vision Zero policies for safety – A comparative policy content analysis.
	McAndrews (2013), Road Safety as a Shared Responsibility and a Public Problem in Swedish Road Safety Policy.
	Rosencrantz et al. (2007), Vision Zero - Is it irrational?
	Tingvall (1997), The Zero Vision - Transportation, Traffic Safety and Health.
	Lie, A. (2012). *Managing traffic safety: an approach to the evaluation of new vehicle safety systems.* Karolinska Institutet (Sweden)
Documents from the Swedish Road Administration (now part of the Swedish Transport Administration) used in the preparatory work and development of Vision Zero	
	Lie and Tingvall. Governmental status report (2001).
	En samlad redovisning av trafiksäkerhetsarbetet mm. Vägverket (2004).
	Nollvisionen – Från idé till genomförande. Belin et al. (2016).
	Nollvisionen – En idé om ett vägtransportsystem utan hälsoförluster. Vägverket (1996).
Reports by third parties	
	Vision Zero 20 years: How dreams become reality. ÅF. Lindberg and Håkansson (2017).
	Sustainable and safe: A vision and guidance for zero road deaths. Welle et al. (2018).
	Rationalitet och etik i samhällsekonomisk analys och Nollvision. VINNOVA (2002:2).
	Uppföljning av mötesfria vägar: slutrapport. Statens väg-och transportforskningsinstitut. Carlsson, A. (2009).
Legislative and national policy documents	
	På väg mot det trafiksäkra samhället. Regeringen, 1997:13. Fritze, Stockholm.
	Kommunikationsdepartementet. Nollvisionen och det trafiksäkra samhället Proposition 1996/97:137., (1997). Stockholm.
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Data Availability

The authors do not have permission to share data.

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Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. *The Academy of Management Annals, 3*(1), 65–107.

Belin, M.Å. (2021), *Transport and Safety: Systems, Approaches, and ImplementationThe Swedish Vision Zero—An Advanced Safety Culture Phenomenon* (pp. 1–28). Singapore: Springer.

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