Revisiting two-hop distance-bounding protocols: Are you really close enough?
Paper in proceedings, 2018

The emergence of ubiquitous computing has led to multiple heterogeneous devices with increased connectivity. In this communication paradigm everything is inter-connected and proximity-based authentication is an indispensable requirement in multiple applications including contactless payments and access control to restricted services/places. Distance-bounding (DB) protocols is the main approach employed to achieve accurate proximity-based authentication. Traditional distance-bounding requires that the prover and the verifier are in each other’s communication range. Recently, Pagnin et al. have proposed a two-hop DB protocol that allows proximity-based authentication, when the prover and the verifier need to rely on an intermediate untrusted party (linker). In this paper, we investigate further the topic of two-hop distance-bounding. We analyse the security of the Pagnin et al. protocol for internal adversaries and we investigate the impact of the position of the linker in the distance-bounding process. We propose a new two-hop DB protocol that is more lightweight and avoids the identified problems. Finally, we extend the protocol to the multi-hop setting and we provide a detailed security analysis for internal adversaries.

Relay attacks

Authentication

Distance-bounding

Author

Nektaria Kaloudi

University of the Aegean

Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

03029743 (ISSN) 16113349 (eISSN)

Vol. 10741 177-188

11th IFIP WG 11.2 International Conference on Information Security Theory and Practice, WISTP 2017
Heraklion, Greece,

Subject Categories

Computer Engineering

Telecommunications

Communication Systems

DOI

10.1007/978-3-319-93524-9_12

More information

Latest update

9/19/2018