Don’t forget your roots: Constant-time root finding over F2m
Paper in proceedings, 2019

In the last few years, post-quantum cryptography has received much attention. NIST is running a competition to select some post-quantum schemes as standard. As a consequence, implementations of post-quantum schemes have become important and with them side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show a timing attack on a code-based scheme which was submitted to the NIST competition. This timing attack recovers secret information because of a timing variance in finding roots in a polynomial. We present four algorithms to find roots that are protected against remote timing exploitation.

Code-based cryptography

Post-quantum cryptography

Roots finding

Side-channel attack

Author

Douglas Martins

Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Gustavo Souza Banegas

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

Eindhoven University of Technology

Ricardo Custódio

Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

03029743 (ISSN) 16113349 (eISSN)

Vol. 11774 LNCS 109-129

6th International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, LATINCRYPT 2019
Santiago de Chile, Chile,

Subject Categories

Computer Engineering

Telecommunications

Communication Systems

DOI

10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_6

More information

Latest update

11/21/2019