Cryptographically Secure Information Flow Control on Key-Value Stores
Paper in proceedings, 2017

We present Clio, an information flow control (IFC) system that
transparently incorporates cryptography to enforce confidentiality
and integrity policies on untrusted storage. Clio insulates develop-
ers from explicitly manipulating keys and cryptographic primitives
by leveraging the policy language of the IFC system to automatically use the appropriate keys and correct cryptographic operations.
We prove that Clio is secure with a novel proof technique that is
based on a proof style from cryptography together with standard
programming languages results. We present a prototype Clio implementation and a case study that demonstrates Clio’s practicality.

information-flow control



Lucas Waye

Harvard University

Pablo Buiras

Harvard University

Owen Arden

University of California

Alejandro Russo

Information Security

Stephen Chong

Harvard University

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

1543-7221 (ISSN)


24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Dallas, USA,

Areas of Advance

Information and Communication Technology

Subject Categories

Computer Science



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