Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems
Journal article, 2010

Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to noncooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Self-stabilization

Distributed computing

Game theory

Game authority

Author

Shlomi Dolev

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Elad Schiller

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

P. G. Spirakis

Computer Technology Institute

Philippas Tsigas

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

Theoretical Computer Science

0304-3975 (ISSN)

Vol. 411 26-28 2459-2466

Subject Categories

Software Engineering

Information Science

Computer Science

DOI

10.1016/j.tcs.2010.02.014

More information

Created

10/7/2017