Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems
Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2010

Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to noncooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


Distributed computing

Game theory

Game authority


Shlomi Dolev

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Elad Schiller

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system

P. G. Spirakis

Computer Technology Institute

Philippas Tsigas

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system

Theoretical Computer Science

0304-3975 (ISSN)

Vol. 411 2459-2466




Datavetenskap (datalogi)