Quantifying Cyber-Security for Networked Control Systems
Paper in proceedings, 2013

In this paper we consider a typical architecture for a networked control system under false-data injection attacks. Under a previously proposed adversary modeling framework, various formulations for quantifying cyber-security of control systems are proposed and formulated as constrained optimization problems. These formulations capture trade-offs in terms of attack impact on the control performance, attack detectability, and adversarial resources. The formulations are then discussed and related to system theoretic concepts, followed by numerical examples illustrating the various trade-offs for a quadruple-tank process.


André Teixeira

Kin Cheong Sou

Chalmers, Mathematical Sciences, Mathematics

University of Gothenburg

Henrik Sandberg

Karl Henrik Johansson

Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences Volume 449, 2013, pp 123-142

Vol. 449 123-142

Areas of Advance

Information and Communication Technology


Subject Categories

Control Engineering



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