Short Paper: Formal Verification of an Authorization Protocol for Remote Vehicle Diagnostics
Paper in proceeding, 2013

Remote diagnostics protocols have generally only considered correct authentication to be enough to grant access to vehicles. However, as diagnostics equipment or their keys can be stolen or copied, these devices can not be trusted. Thus, authentication alone is not enough to prevent unauthorized access to vehicles. In previous work, we proposed an authorization protocol to prevent unauthorized access to vehicles. In this paper, we formally prove that the proposed authorization protocol provides mutual authentication between the diagnostics equipment and the vehicle, and that it guarantees both secrecy of the distributed session key and freshness of the distributed authorization information. Our formal analysis is conducted using both the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) Logic and the PROVERIF automated verification tool.

authorization protocol

remote diagnostics

connected car.

formal verification

Author

Pierre Kleberger

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

Guilhem Moulin

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Computing Science (Chalmers)

IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference, VNC

21579857 (ISSN) 21579865 (eISSN)

202-205
978-1-4799-2687-9 (ISBN)

Areas of Advance

Transport

Subject Categories

Computer and Information Science

DOI

10.1109/VNC.2013.6737613

ISBN

978-1-4799-2687-9

More information

Latest update

10/5/2023