Short Paper: Formal Verification of an Authorization Protocol for Remote Vehicle Diagnostics
Paper i proceeding, 2013

Remote diagnostics protocols have generally only considered correct authentication to be enough to grant access to vehicles. However, as diagnostics equipment or their keys can be stolen or copied, these devices can not be trusted. Thus, authentication alone is not enough to prevent unauthorized access to vehicles. In previous work, we proposed an authorization protocol to prevent unauthorized access to vehicles. In this paper, we formally prove that the proposed authorization protocol provides mutual authentication between the diagnostics equipment and the vehicle, and that it guarantees both secrecy of the distributed session key and freshness of the distributed authorization information. Our formal analysis is conducted using both the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) Logic and the PROVERIF automated verification tool.

authorization protocol

remote diagnostics

connected car.

formal verification

Författare

Pierre Kleberger

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system

Guilhem Moulin

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Datavetenskap

IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), Proceedings. Boston, 16-18 Dec. 2013

2157-9865 (eISSN)

202-205

Styrkeområden

Transport

Ämneskategorier

Data- och informationsvetenskap

DOI

10.1109/VNC.2013.6737613

ISBN

978-1-4799-2687-9