Revisiting Yasuda et al.’s Biometric Authentication Protocol: Are you Private Enough?
Paper in proceedings, 2018

Biometric Authentication Protocols (BAPs) have increasingly been employed to guarantee reliable access control to places and services. However, it is well-known that biometric traits contain sensitive information of individuals and if compromised could lead to serious security and privacy breaches. Yasuda et al. [23] proposed a distributed privacy-preserving BAP which Abidin et al. [1] have shown to be vulnerable to biometric template recovery attacks under the presence of a malicious computational server. In this paper, we fix the weaknesses of Yasuda et al.’s BAP and present a detailed instantiation of a distributed privacy-preserving BAP which is resilient against the attack presented in [1]. Our solution employs Backes et al.’s [4] verifiable computation scheme to limit the possible misbehaviours of a malicious computational server.

Verifiable Delegation

Privacy- Preserving Authentication.

Biometric Authentication

Author

Elena Pagnin

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

Jing Liu

Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

Chalmers, Computer Science and Engineering (Chalmers), Networks and Systems (Chalmers)

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

03029743 (ISSN) 16113349 (eISSN)

Vol. 11261 161-178

16th International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2017)
Hong Kong, China,

Subject Categories

Computer Engineering

Communication Systems

Computer Science

DOI

10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_8

More information

Latest update

1/22/2019