Deceptive Jamming in WLAN Sensing

Paper in proceeding, 2024

Joint Communication and Sensing (JCAS) is taking its first shape in WLAN sensing under IEEE 802.11bf, where standardized WLAN signals and protocols are exploited to enable radar-like sensing. However, an overlooked problem in JCAS, and specifically in WLAN Sensing, is the sensitivity of the system to a deceptive jammer, which introduces phantom targets to mislead the victim radar receiver. Standardized waveforms and sensing parameters make the system vulnerable to physical layer attacks. Moreover, orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) makes deceptive jamming even easier as it allows digitally generated artificial range/Doppler maps. This paper studies deceptive jamming in J CAS, with a special focus on WLAN Sensing. The provided mathematical models give insights into how to design jamming signals and their impact on the sensing system. Numerical analyses illustrate various distortions caused by deceptive jamming, while the experimental results validate the need for meticulous J CAS design to protect the system against physical layer attacks in the form of deceptive Jamming.