Dynamic vs. Static Flow-Sensitive Security Analysis
Paper i proceeding, 2010

This paper seeks to answer fundamental questions about trade-offs between static and dynamic security analysis. It has been previously shown that flow-sensitive static information-flow analysis is a natural generalization of flow-insensitive static analysis, which allows accepting more secure programs. It has been also shown that sound purely dynamic information-flow enforcement is more permissive than static analysis in the flow-insensitive case. We argue that the step from flow-insensitive to flow-sensitive is fundamentally limited for purely dynamic information-flow controls. We prove impossibility of a sound purely dynamic information-flow monitor that accepts programs certified by a classical flow-sensitive static analysis. A side implication is impossibility of permissive dynamic instrumented security semantics for information flow, which guides us to uncover an unsound semantics from the literature. We present a general framework for hybrid mechanisms that is parameterized in the static part and in the reaction method of the enforcement (stop, suppress, or rewrite) and give security guarantees with respect to termination-insensitive noninterference for a simple language with output.


Alejandro Russo

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Datavetenskap

Andrei Sabelfeld

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Datavetenskap

Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

1940-1434 (ISSN)



Datavetenskap (datalogi)