The Third Generation (3G) Auction in Asia
Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2011
This study examines a winner’s curse in the third generation (3G) spectrum auction for selected Asian countries during 2000-2006. The winner’s curse is a phenomenon that a winner will tend to overpay in an auction, making the license unprofitable. An event study has been employed as a method in order to assess a winner’s curse through the analysis of security prices of the firms involved in the auction. The cumulative abnormal return of stock price post auction indicates whether the firm in question paid too much for the license. The results reveal that there is a mix of positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns of winner firms. Most of the winner firms have a negative cumulative abnormal return until the end of auctions. After fourteen days, there are signs of reward since the stock prices of winning bidders increase. This finding indicates that the 3G licenses in Asian countries face a very short term of winner’s curse. The short period of a negative abnormal return is obtained by the reduction of reserve price and relaxation of the licensing condition by National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs).