Tracking Information Flows in Interactive and Object-Oriented Programs
Licentiatavhandling, 2012

This thesis improves the current state of the art on information-flow control of interactive and object-oriented programs, respectively. Given a policy which specifies which information flows are permitted in a program, the objective here is to ensure that only flows satisfying the policy can occur. The challenge is to develop a sane policy and an automated, permissive enforcement mechanism for said policy. For interactive programs, we give a progress-sensitive noninterference (PSNI) policy which takes into account the confidentiality level of the presence of messages. We show that the finer granularity obtained through presence levels makes PSNI parallel compositional, and we give a proven-sound, static, flow-sensitive type-based enforcement of PSNI. We show that for deterministic interactive programs, it suffices to consider simple stream-based attackers. We develop in this setting a progress-bounded noninterference (PBNI) which bounds the leak through progress observations to a logarithm of the number of observable inputs to the program. We combine a static, flow-sensitive type-based enforcement for a progress-insensitive noninterference policy and a output-buffering program transformation to a hybrid enforcement of PBNI for a language inspired by JavaScript. The enforcement tracks flows through hithero untreaded language constructs, such as event propagation, event hierarchies and event handler switching. For object-oriented programs, we present a static, flow-sensitive type system for tracking flows through lazy static class initializations with persistent failures, a language construct in languages such as Java and C#, untreated by tools such as Jif. We show how a class initialization status can be utilized as a covert channel for moving 1 bit of information, and show that the type system enforces a termination-insensitive notion of noninterference.

information security

privacy

static analysis

information flow

program analysis

confidentiality

dependency analysis

EC
Opponent: David Clark, Department of Computer Science, University College London, United Kingdom

Författare

Willard Thor Rafnsson

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik

Limiting Information Leakage in Event-based Communication

ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security,; (2011)p. (Article no. 4)-

Paper i proceeding

Styrkeområden

Informations- och kommunikationsteknik

Fundament

Grundläggande vetenskaper

Ämneskategorier

Programvaruteknik

Technical report L - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology and Göteborg University: 1652-876X

EC

Opponent: David Clark, Department of Computer Science, University College London, United Kingdom