We are family: Relating information-flow trackers
Konferensbidrag (offentliggjort, men ej förlagsutgivet), 2017

While information-flow security is a well-established area, there is an unsettling gap between heavyweight information-flow control, with formal guarantees yet limited practical impact, and lightweight tainting techniques, useful for bug finding yet lacking formal assurance. This paper proposes a framework for exploring the middle ground in the range of enforcement from tainting (tracking data flows only) to fully-fledged information-flow control (tracking both data and control flows). We formally illustrate the trade-offs between the soundness and permissiveness that the framework allows to achieve. The framework is deployed in a staged fashion, statically embedding a dynamic monitor, being parametric in security policies, as they do not need to be fixed until the final deployment. This flexibility facilitates a secure app store architecture, where the static stage of verification is performed by the app store and the dynamic stage is deployed on the client. To illustrate the practicality of the framework, we implement our approach for a core of Java and evaluate it on a use case with enforcing privacy policies in the Android setting. We also show how a state-of-the-art dynamic monitor for JavaScript can be easily adapted to implement our approach. © 2017, Springer International Publishing AG.

Taint tracking

Information-flow control

Language-based security

Författare

Musard Balliu

Programvaruteknik

Daniel Schoepe

Programvaruteknik

Andrei Sabelfeld

Programvaruteknik

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

0302-9743 (ISSN)

Vol. 10492 LNCS 124-145

Styrkeområden

Informations- och kommunikationsteknik

Ämneskategorier

Programvaruteknik

DOI

10.1007/978-3-319-66402-6_9

ISBN

9783319664019

Mer information

Skapat

2017-10-07