Analyzing and Securing Bluetooth-based Pico Networks
We have examined Bluetooth-based Pico-network (Piconet) applications in wireless computing and
cellular devices and found an extensive number of ``unexpected abuses'', where the security
expectations of the device owner can be violated. We have studied the underlying causes of
such problems and found that many products lack the controls to administer these devices securely.
We also observe cases where explicit security claims from the Bluetooth protocol are not satisfied.
Our conclusion is that the current Bluetooth protocol (version 2.0) cannot be used to create Piconets
in a secure way. We classify a number of abuses and security violations as Bluetooth protocol design flaws,
application-layer implementation errors or simply pitfalls in the security management. Using this classification
we define a core set of requirements that would improve Bluetooth security significantly. We also discuss how such
requirements could be applied to the automobile domain.