Trade-offs in Data-Driven False Data Injection Attacks Against the Power Grid
Paper i proceeding, 2018

We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a limited period of time) and no other prior knowledge about the grid. Existing related algorithms are formulated under the assumption that the attacker has access to measurements collected over a long (asymptotically infinite) time period, which may not be realistic. We show that these approaches do not perform well when the attacker has a limited number of data samples only. We design an enhanced algorithm to construct FDI attack vectors in the face of limited measurements that can nevertheles bypass the BDD with high probability. Furthermore, we characterize an important trade-off between the attack's BDD-bypass probability and its sparsity, which affects the spatial extent of the attack that must be achieved. Extensive simulations using data traces collected from the MATPOWER simulator and benchmark IEEE bus systems validate our findings.

sparsity of attack vector

BDD-bypass probability

Data-driven FDI attack

bad data detection


Subhash Lakshminarayana

Advanced Digital Sciences Center (ADSC)

Fuxi Wen

Chalmers, Elektroteknik, Kommunikations- och antennsystem, Kommunikationssystem

David K. Y. Yau

Singapore University of Technology and Design

Advanced Digital Sciences Center (ADSC)

ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings

15206149 (ISSN)


IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP)
Calgary, Canada,


Elektroteknik och elektronik





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