Transparent IFC Enforcement: Possibility and (In)Efficiency Results
Paper i proceeding, 2020

Information Flow Control (IFC) is a collection of techniques for ensuring a no-write-down no-read-up style security policy known as noninterference. Traditional methods for both static (e.g. type systems) and dynamic (e.g. runtime monitors) IFC suffer from untenable numbers of false alarms on real-world programs. Secure Multi-Execution (SME) promises to provide secure information flow control without modifying the behaviour of already secure programs, a property commonly referred to as transparency. Implementations of SME exist for the web in the form of the FlowFox browser and as plug-ins to several programming languages. Furthermore, SME can in theory work in a black-box manner, meaning that it can be programming language agnostic, making it perfect for securing legacy or third-party systems. As such SME, and its variants like Multiple Facets (MF) and Faceted Secure Multi-Execution (FSME), appear to be a family of panaceas for the security engineer. The question is, how come, given all these advantages, that these techniques are not ubiquitous in practice?The answer lies, partially, in the issue of runtime and memory overhead. SME and its variants are prohibitively expensive to deploy in many non-trivial situations. The natural question is why is this the case? On the surface, the reason is simple. The techniques in the SME family all rely on the idea of multi-execution, running all or parts of a program multiple times to achieve noninterference. Naturally, this causes some overhead. However, the predominant thinking in the IFC community has been that these overheads can be overcome. In this paper we argue that there are fundamental reasons to expect this not to be the case and prove two key theorems:•All transparent enforcement is polynomial time equivalent to multi-execution.•All black-box enforcement takes time exponential in the number of principals in the security lattice.Our methods also allow us to answer, in the affirmative, an open question about the possibility of secure and transparent enforcement of a security condition known as Termination Insensitive Noninterference.



Information Flow Control

Secure Multi-Execution





Maximilian Algehed

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Funktionell programmering

Cormac Flanagan

University of California

Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

19401434 (ISSN)

Vol. 2020-June 65-78 9155193

33rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2020
Virtual, Online, USA,



Datavetenskap (datalogi)




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