Blockchain Competition Between Miners: A Game Theoretic Perspective
Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2020

We model the competition over mining resources and over several cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Leveraging results about congestion games, we establish conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria. We account for multiple system models, varying according to the way that mining resources are allocated and shared and according to the granularity at which mining puzzle complexity is adjusted. When constraints on resources are included, the resulting game is a constrained resource allocation game for which we characterize a normalized Nash equilibrium. Under the proposed models, we provide structural properties of the corresponding types of equilibrium, e.g., establishing conditions under which at most two mining infrastructures will be active or under which no miners will have incentives to mine a given cryptocurrency.

Författare

Eitan Altman

INRIA Sophia Antipolis

Daniel Menasché

Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)

Alexandre Reiffers-Masson

Indian Institute of Science

Mandar Datar

INRIA Sophia Antipolis

Swapnil Vilas Dhamal

Chalmers, Rymd-, geo- och miljövetenskap, Fysisk resursteori, Fysisk resursteori 2

Corinne Touati

INRIA Grenoble

Rachid El-Azouzi

Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon

Frontiers in Blockchain

Vol. 2 26

Styrkeområden

Informations- och kommunikationsteknik

Ämneskategorier

Reglerteknik

Datavetenskap (datalogi)

Datorsystem

DOI

10.3389/fbloc.2019.00026

Mer information

Skapat

2020-10-13