Optimal Multiphase Investment Strategies for Influencing Opinions in a Social Network
Paper i proceeding, 2018

We study the problem of two competing camps aiming to maximize the adoption of their respective opinions, by optimally investing in nodes of a social network in multiple phases. The final opinion of a node in a phase acts as its biased opinion in the following phase. Using an extension of Friedkin-Johnsen model, we formulate the camps' utility functions, which we show to involve what can be interpreted as multiphase Katz centrality. We hence present optimal investment strategies of the camps, and the loss incurred if myopic strategy is employed. Simulations affirm that nodes attributing higher weightage to bias necessitate higher investment in initial phase. The extended version of this paper analyzes a setting where a camp's influence on a node depends on the node's bias; we show existence and polynomial time computability of Nash equilibrium.

Nash Equilibrium

Zero-sum Games

Social Networks

Katz Centrality

Opinion Dynamics

Multiple Phases


Swapnil Vilas Dhamal

Telecom SudParis

Walid Ben-Ameur

Telecom SudParis

Tijani Chahed

Telecom SudParis

Eitan Altman

Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (INRIA)

AAMAS 2018 - Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems


17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2018
Stockholm, Sweden,


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