Efficient Synthesis of Sensor Deception Attacks Using Observation Equivalence-Based Abstraction
Paper i proceeding, 2020
This paper investigates the synthesis of successful sensor deception attack functions in supervisory control using abstraction methods to reduce computational complexity. In sensor deception attacks, an attacker hijacks a subset of the sensors of the plant and feeds incorrect information to the supervisor with the intent on causing damage to the supervised system. The attacker is successful if its attack causes damage to the system and it is not identified by an intrusion detection module. The existence test and the synthesis method of successful sensor deception attack functions are computationally expensive, specifically in partially observed systems. For this reason, we leverage results on abstraction methods to reduce the computational effort in solving these problems. Namely, we introduce an equivalence relation called restricted observation equivalence, that is used to abstract the original system before calculating attack functions. Based on this equivalence relation we prove that the existence of successful attack functions in the abstracted supervised system guarantees the existence of successful attack functions in the unabstracted supervised system and vice versa. Moreover, successful attack functions synthesized from the abstracted system can be exactly mapped to successful attack functions on the unabstracted system, thereby providing a complete solution to the attack synthesis problem.
Supervisory Control Theory