Free Riding is Not the Problem: How Agency, Heterogeneity and Authority Challenge Collective Action Against Antimicrobial Resistance in the European Union

Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2024

This paper outlines a contextual approach to the governance of collective action in high complexity contexts. Using the major public health threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in Europe as empirical case, we investigate the coordination challenges related to a plurality of agency, heterogeneity of capabilities, preferences and institutions, and various degrees and forms of authority. The analysis draws on original quantitative and qualitative data on senior public servants’ and experts’ preferences for governance arrangements. Allowing for variation in agency, heterogeneity and authority, we identify factors preventing or facilitating transnational governance and explain how and why these factors persist. The pattern of experts’ governance preferences as indicated in surveys and interviews suggests that when collective action fails, it can often be attributed to the heterogeneity among EU member states in terms of their willingness and capacity to address AMR. Also, networks of AMR experts are seen as critical to successful governance, both in the human public health sector where formal authority is limited and in animal health where the EU has extensive formal authority. In human public health, networks are instruments for exchanging ideas, knowledge and learning while in animal health networks support hierarchies and facilitate horizontal coordination.