Strategic reasoning and bargaining in catastrophic climate change games
Journal article, 2016

Two decades of international negotiations show that agreeing on emission levels for climate change mitigation is a hard challenge. However, if early warning signals were to show an upcoming tipping point with catastrophic damage, theory and experiments suggest this could simplify collective action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the actual threshold, no country would have a free-ride incentive to increase emissions over the tipping point, but it remains for countries to negotiate their emission levels to reach these agreements. We model agents bargaining for emission levels using strategic reasoning to predict emission bids by others and ask how this affects the possibility of reaching agreements that avoid catastrophic damage. It is known that policy elites often use a higher degree of strategic reasoning, and in our model this increases the risk for climate catastrophe. Moreover, some forms of higher strategic reasoning make agreements to reduce greenhouse gases unstable. We use empirically informed levels of strategic reasoning when simulating the model.

Environmental economics

Climate-change mitigation

Climate-change policy

Author

Vilhelm Verendel

Chalmers, Energy and Environment, Physical Resource Theory

Daniel Johansson

Chalmers, Energy and Environment, Physical Resource Theory

Kristian Lindgren

Chalmers, Energy and Environment, Physical Resource Theory

Nature Climate Change

1758-678X (ISSN) 1758-6798 (eISSN)

3 265-268

Driving Forces

Sustainable development

Areas of Advance

Transport

Energy

Subject Categories

Other Earth and Related Environmental Sciences

Roots

Basic sciences

DOI

10.1038/nclimate2849

More information

Created

10/7/2017