Timing Aware Information Flow Security for a JavaCard-like Bytecode
Paper i proceeding, 2005

Common protection mechanisms fail to provide end-to-end security; programs with legitimate access to secret information are not prevented from leaking this to the world. Information-flow aware analyses track the flow of information through the program to prevent such leakages, but often ignore information flows through covert channels even though they pose a serious threat. A typical covert channel is to use the timing of certain events to carry information. We present a timing-aware information-flow type system for a low-level language similar to a non-trivial subset of a sequential Java bytecode. The type system is parameterized over the time model of the instructions of the language and over the algorithm enforcing low-observational equivalence, used in the prevention of implicit and timing flows.

Författare

Daniel Hedin

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Datavetenskap

David Sands

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Datavetenskap

Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science

1571-0661 (ISSN)

Vol. 141 163-182

Ämneskategorier

Datavetenskap (datalogi)

DOI

10.1016/j.entcs.2005.02.031