Board participation, toeholds and the cross-border effect
Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2013

Research shows that the bid announcement return (BAR) of the acquiring firm is lower for cross-border than domestic acquisition announcements. The current lack of economically based explanations for this effect, labeled the cross-border effect by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), motivates our study. We use unique hand-collected corporate governance data to study how the relationships between acquiring and target firms prior to a bid announcement affect the cross-border effect. Our tests show that non-operating associations between the acquiring and target firms, in the form of board participation and toeholds, have a positive effect on the BAR. The cross-border effect disappears when we control for board participation and toeholds. Thus, we suggest that the cross-border effect is at least partly a consequence of information asymmetries and the adverse selection problem that they generate.


Board participation

Cross-border acquisitions

Cross-border effect



Mattias Hamberg

Conny Overland

Göteborgs universitet

International Business Review

0969-5931 (ISSN)

Vol. 22 5 868-882