Evolution and the Backward Induction Problem in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
The finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (RPD) is a model of a social dilemma where cooperation is particularly hard to come by. The standard way to solve the game is using
backward induction, which by a particular logic gradually eliminates all cooperation from the end of a repeated game. This eliminates cooperation from backwards, with the result
that the players defect from the start of the game. This thesis includes two population-based evolutionary models with strategies discussed in the backward induction literature. First, we consider strategies that can eliminate cooperation to a varying degree from backwards.
Second, we also include strategies that can act and react to cooperative out-of-equilibrium play in the first step of the RPD. For both of the models we show and examine the conditions under which recurrent cooperation can appear in the population.
Out of equilibrium
Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma