A One Year Pay-as-You-Speed Trial With Economic Incentives for Not Speeding
Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2014
Objective: The objective was to identify whether it was possible to change driver behavior by economic incentives and thereby reduce crash risk. Furthermore, the objective was to evaluate the participants' attitudes toward the pay-as-you-speed (PAYS) concept. Methods: A one-year PAYS trial with economic incentives for keeping speed limits using intelligent speed assistance (ISA) was conducted in Sweden during 2011-2012. The full incentive was a 30 percent discount off the insurance premium. The participants were private insurance customers and were randomized into a test group (initial n = 152, final n = 128) and a control group (initial n = 98, final n = 68). When driving, the drivers in the test group were informed and warned visually when the speed limit was exceeded. They could also follow their driving results on a personal website. The control group was not given any feedback at all. To reflect the impact of the PAYS concept the proportion of distance driven above the speed limit was compared between the 2 groups. Results: The introduction of a PAYS concept shows that the test group significantly reduced the proportion of distance driven above the speed limit. The proportion of driving at a speed exceeding 5 km/h over the speed limit was 6 percent for the test group and 14 percent for the control group. It also showed that the effect was higher the higher the violation of speed. The result remained constant over time. Conclusions: It was shown that a PAYS concept is an effective way to reduce speed violations. Hence, it has the possibility to reduce crash severity and thereby to save lives. This could be an important step toward a safer road transport system. The majority of the participants were in favor of the concept, which indicates the potential of a new insurance product in the future.
driver assistance systems