JSFlow: Tracking Information Flow in JavaScript and its APIs

Paper i proceeding, 2014

JavaScript drives the evolution of the web into a powerful application platform. Increasingly, web applications combine services from different providers. The script inclusion mechanism routinely turns barebone web pages into full-fledged services built up from third-party code. Such code provides a range of facilities from helper utilities (such as jQuery) to readily available services (such as Google Analytics and Tynt). Script inclusion poses a challenge of ensuring that the integrated third-party code respects security and privacy. This paper presents JSFlow, a security-enhanced JavaScript interpreter for fine-grained tracking of information flow. We show how to resolve practical challenges for enforcing information-flow policies for the full JavaScript language, as well as tracking information in the presence of libraries, as provided by browser APIs. The interpreter is itself written in JavaScript, which enables deployment as a browser extension. Our experiments with the extension provide in-depth understanding of information manipulation by third-party scripts such as Google Analytics. We find that different sites intended to provide similar services effectuate rather different security policies for the user's sensitive information: some ensure it does not leave the browser, others share it with the originating server, while yet others freely propagate it to third parties. Copyright 2014 ACM.