Complexity and stability in growing cancer cell populations

Övrig text i vetenskaplig tidskrift, 2015

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) describes dynamics in populations in which individual fitness can change because of the interactions with others, called frequency-dependent selection (1). Interactions are driven by differences in phenotype. EGT has been proposed as a framework for evolutionary dynamics of tumors (2). An underlying assumption is that different cancer cell types within a tumor engage in different heritable behavior; thus, frequency-dependent selection acts. Until now there has been little direct empirical evidence for this. The study by Archetti et al. (3) demonstrates frequency-dependent growth rates of two phenotypically distinct cancer subclones. One clone produced the insulin-like growth factor (IGF)-II, the other did not. In a mix of producers and nonproducers, the growth rates of both clones varied with the frequency of producers. Because a similar effect was shown when varying the concentration of serum, the production of IGF-II could be viewed as a public goods game.