Revisiting Yasuda et al.’s Biometric Authentication Protocol: Are you Private Enough?
Paper i proceeding, 2017

Biometric Authentication Protocols (BAPs) have increasingly been employed to guarantee reliable access control to places and services. However, it is well-known that biometric traits contain sensitive information of individuals and if compromised could lead to serious security and privacy breaches. Yasuda et al. [23] proposed a distributed privacy-preserving BAP which Abidin et al. [1] have shown to be vulnerable to biometric template recovery attacks under the presence of a malicious computational server. In this paper, we fix the weaknesses of Yasuda et al.’s BAP and present a detailed instantiation of a distributed privacy-preserving BAP which is resilient against the attack presented in [1]. Our solution employs Backes et al.’s [4] verifiable computation scheme to limit the possible misbehaviours of a malicious computational server.

Biometric Authentication

Verifiable Delegation

Privacy- Preserving Authentication.

Författare

Elena Pagnin

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system

Jing Liu

Organisation okänd

Aikaterini Mitrokotsa

Chalmers, Data- och informationsteknik, Nätverk och system

16th International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2017)
Hong Kong, China,

Ämneskategorier

Datorteknik

Kommunikationssystem

Datavetenskap (datalogi)

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Skapat

2018-07-27