A Probe into Process-Level Attack Detection in Industrial Environments from a Side-Channel Perspective
Paper i proceeding, 2019
Process-level detection of cyberattacks on industrial controlsystems pertain to observing the physical process to detectimplausible behavior. State-of-the-art techniques identify abaseline of the normal process behavior from historical mea-surements and then monitor the system operation in realtime to detect deviations from the baseline. Evidently, thesetechniques are intended to be connected to the control flowto be able to acquire and analyze the necessary measure-ment data, which makes them susceptible to compromiseby the attacker. In this paper, we approach process-levelattack detection from a side-channel perspective, where weinvestigate the feasibility and efficacy of monitoring indus-trial machines through external sensors. The sensors measurephysical properties of the process that are bound to changenoticeably during a cyberattack. We demonstrate the viabil-ity of our approach through simulations and experiments onreal industrial machines.
Industrial Control System